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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis evaluates and explores the function of Private Military Companies 
(PMCs) on the African continent. The phenomenon of PMCs evolved after the end 
of the Cold War. This study focuses on the relevant international and national 
legislation regulating PMCs that conduct active military assistance operations. 
These PMC operations have a strategic impact on the political, social, economical 
and security environments of the areas in which they are contracted to operate. 
The purpose of the thesis is to assess whether PMCs are efficient and cost 
effective, can be held accountable and to whom, and if current legislation (national 
and international) regulating PMCs is sufficient. 
 
This thesis is a literature survey that seeks descriptive and comparative information 
relevant to the purpose of this study. It deals with that information qualitatively. No 
empirical research has been conducted. It is therefore not an opinion survey as no 
questionnaires have been completed, although interviews with knowledgeable 
people have been conducted. The thesis focuses on the operations conducted by 
the now defunct Executive Outcomes (of the Republic of South Africa), a combat 
type PMC in Angola and Sierra Leone and Military Professional Resources 
Incorporated (of the United States of America), a non-combat type PMC in 
Equatorial Guinea. 
 
The study concludes that PMC operations through legitimate government contracts 
at international level are indeed legitimate. The regulations (international and 
national, if they exist) regarding PMCs are not sufficient, and allow for many grey 
areas. PMCs that operate in this sphere of grey areas are unacceptable for the 
international community in the current milieu. PMCs are, however, operating in a 
vacuum of accountability and regulation (international and national). With sufficient 
legislation, PMCs could be the new peacemakers. 
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 OPSOMMING 
 
Hierdie tesis evalueer en ondersoek die funksionering van Privaat Militêre 
Maatskappye (PMM’e) en hul werksaamhede in Afrika. Die PMM-verskynsel het 
voortgespruit uit die stilstand van die Koue Oorlog. Die tesis fokus op die relevante 
internasionale en nasionale wetgewing rakende PMM’e wat aktief in een of ander 
formaat by militêre operasies betrokke is. Hierdie PMM-operasies het ’n 
beduidende strategiese impak op die sosio-politiese, ekonomiese en 
sekuriteitareas van die gebiede waartoe hul gekontrakteer is. Die doel van die tesis 
is om die effektiwiteit en koste-effektiwiteit van PMM’e te evalueer, asook om uit te 
vind of hulle aanspreeklik is en aan wie hulle verantwoording moet doen. Daar is 
ook gefokus op huidige wetgewing (internasionaal sowel as nasionaal) rakende 
PMM’e om die doeltreffendheid van sodanige wetgewing te bepaal. 
 
Hierdie tesis is ‘n opname van beskrywende en vergelykende literatuurstudies, 
relevant tot die doel van die tesis. Inligting is kwalitatief aangewend. Geen 
empiriese navorsing is onderneem nie. Hierdie tesis is ook nie gebaseer op ‘n 
meningsopname nie. Geen vraelyste is ingevul nie, maar daar is wel onderhoude 
met kenners van die betrokke vakgebied gevoer. Die tesis fokus op die vroeëre 
werksaamhede van die ontbinde “Executive Outcomes” as Suid-Afrikaanse PMM 
wat aktief betrokke was by oorlogvoering in Angola en Sierra Leone en ook op die 
steeds aktiewe Amerikaanse PMM “Military Professional Resources Incorporated” 
wat in Ekwatoriaal Guinieë werksaam is en wat nie aktief by oorlogvoering 
betrokke raak nie. 
 
Die tesis kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat PMM-kontrakte wat bekom word deur 
legitieme regeringskontrakte op internasionale vlak wel legitiem is. Daar is bevind 
dat wetgewing (internasionaal en nasionaal, waar wel beskikbaar) rakende PMM’e 
egter nie voldoende en effektief is nie. Daar is steeds baie grys areas rakende 
verantwoordbaarheid en wetgewing van PMM’e. Dit is in hierdie grys areas waarin 
baie PMM’e funksioneer en waardeur hulle onaanvaarbaar vir die internasionale 
gemeenskap in die huidige klimaat is. Doeltreffende wetgewing kan moontlik 
verseker dat PMM’e die nuwe vredemakers kan word. 
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 CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Problem statement 
 
Winston Churchill once said, “There is only one thing certain about war, that is, that 
it is full of disappointments and also full of mistakes” (Paull, 1960:preface). “Some 
people see the tide of war come and go and have the knack to adapt to whatever 
situation comes their way. They let fate roll over them without offering resistance 
and consider their abnormal way of life to be completely normal. Maybe they are 
right.” (Breytenbach, 2002a:7). To some, private military companies (PMCs) might 
be abnormal companies to work for, but to others these companies might be their 
only way to make a living as skilled soldiers. To avoid disappointment and possible 
mistakes, PMCs need to be regulated, since they might have a valuable role to 
play in the future. 
 
Today after the Cold War era different players stepped into the arena of modern 
warfare. One of the participants that emerged from the end of the Cold War is 
Private Military Companies/Firms (PMC/Fs). According to Bardal & Keen (1997) 
post-modern conflicts involve substantial economic aspects. Entrepreneurs make 
use of opportunities to profit from the uncertainties created by widespread conflict.  
 
Malaquias (2001:317) feels that, in the absence of a global ideological divide, both 
old and new wars will be sustained by more regional, national, even local factors of 
political economy, ethnicity, religion, personal ambition and greed. The new spate 
of wars according to Smith (2002:22) will be organised mainly around economic 
gain and fought over resources, with state armies becoming more commercially 
minded. Van Creveld (1991:226) states that as new forms of armed conflicts 
multiplied and spread, they cause the lines between public and private, 
government and people, military and civilian, to become as blurred as they were 
before 1648 The Peace of Westphalia. After 1648 to 1939 the state was the main 
actor in the wars fought in the modern era. According to Reno (2000) “new wars” in 
Africa reveal three characteristics: they happen in weak states, non-state actors 
such as rebels are prominent and the privatisation of inter-state relations is 
relevant. 
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 Reno (1998:2) mentions that the term “weak state” signifies a spectrum of 
conventional state capabilities that exists alongside (generally very strong) informal 
political networks. Another critical feature of this spectrum is that of collective 
versus private interests, for example, inhabitants of a collapsed (bureaucratic) state 
may enjoy security because of the presence of an armed organisation seeking 
mineral resources for the benefits of its members and shareholders. A surplus of 
weapons in Africa after the Cold War and greedy warlords, rulers, rebels and 
mercantilists add to the conflicts in Africa (Breytenbach, 2002b:4). With poverty 
suffocating the continent, Breytenbach (2002b) states that it could be explained 
why the majority of contemporary wars are more internal than international and 
why wars are mostly about resources (especially oil, gas, and diamonds). 
 
After the withdrawal of superpower military support at the end of the Cold War, a 
growing number of nations, mostly in Africa, were unable to provide the necessary 
security for their citizens. Smith (2002:22) mentions that as western countries sold 
off their state assets and ran down their civil services, many domestic security 
tasks were outsourced to private companies. Weak states tend to have a problem 
in the sense that they cannot provide national unity or national security for their 
citizens, from policing, to the criminal justice system, to social services, or to the 
military (Krasner, 1985:28). Migdal (1988:4-5) states that “capabilities of states 
include the capacities to penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract 
resources, and to appropriate or use resources in determined ways. Strong states 
are those with high capabilities to fulfil these tasks, while weak states are on the 
low end of a spectrum of capabilities.” Weak states (for example Iraq and Sierra 
Leone in Africa) are therefore incapable of enforcing/keeping peace in their own 
territories, because of their weakness and the lack of financial resources. 
 
PMCs are becoming increasingly involved in certain areas, on the African continent 
and also the war in Iraq. Shearer (1998b:9-10) states that Western states have 
become reluctant to deploy forces in areas in which they have little direct strategic 
interest, or where the risks of involvement are unacceptably high. This reluctance 
according to Shearer (1998b:10) creates a market opportunity for military 
companies which have in some cases acted as foreign policy proxies for 
governments unable or unwilling to play a direct and open role. According to 
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 Jackson (2002:33) and Reno (2000:286), the process of globalisation and weak 
states have widened the number and type of participants engaging in Africa’s 
internal conflicts. 
 
It is striking that the countries in Africa most associated with the use of mercenaries 
and PMCs – Angola, Sierra Leone and Zaire (Katanga) – are those with readily 
available mineral resources. These countries attract direct foreign investment. 
According to Breytenbach (2002b:7), the 1998 World Investment Report found that 
the major reason for foreign direct investment in Africa is “resource-seeking” and 
that investors hardly make a distinction between democracies and non-
democracies (for example between Botswana or Angola and Equatorial Guinea). 
Mineral resources attract lawful foreign direct investment, but unfortunately also 
mercenaries, as was the case in Katanga in the 1960s. 
 
Bayart, Ellis & Hibou (1999:xvi) state that in Africa interaction between the practice 
of power, war, economic accumulation and illicit activities of various types of forms 
a particular political trajectory which can only be fully appreciated if it is addressed 
in historical depth. Characteristics of this trajectory, according to Bayart et al 
(1999), are the exploitation by dominant social groups or by the dominant social 
actors of the moment, of a whole series of rents generated by Africa’s insertion into 
the international economy in a mode of dependence. Current relevant examples for 
the purpose of this study are the rents gained from the exports of oil, gold and 
diamonds, internal financing and aid. Talif Deen (cited in Arnold, 1999:117) 
mentions that “after companies gain concessions, the firm apparently begins to 
exploit the concessions it has received by setting up a number of associates and 
affiliates which engage in such activities as air transport, road building and import 
and export, thereby acquiring a significant, if not hegemonic, presence in the 
economic life of the country in which it is operating.” 
 
PMCs’ involvement in Africa, specifically Executive Outcomes (as a combat type 
that disestablished in 1999), have questioned the claims that they have ulterior 
motives when taking on a mission. PMCs may have ulterior (profit) motives, but 
unlike mercenaries, PMCs are, as a rule, invited by the host state and in the cases 
of the USA and the RSA, their home states have legislation that regulates their 
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 existence. In the case of Angola and Sierra Leone, PMCs were invited, and 
arguably made the environment more peaceful for their fragile democracies to 
function, for example for elections to be held. The existence of PMCs therefore, 
creates an interesting challenge for legislators and policymakers since PMCs 
regard themselves as providers of security services to those who are in need of 
expertise and support, and willing to pay for these services. 
 
McIntyre (2004) mentions that the real issue is neither peace or profits nor the 
plundering of resources but governance and transparency, accountability and rule 
of law that need to be adhered to. Smith (2002:22) believes that the use of private 
militaries has not worked, because regulating them would need international 
machinery and a political consensus that few are interested in establishing. Smith 
(2002) states the unravelling of the Equatorial Guinea “rent-a-coup” plot was a 
palpable hit for the anti-private military lobby and a blow for those companies 
edging towards respectability. 
 
PMCs could therefore be emerging as valuable players in foreign policy strategy. 
The latter is a topic that needs to be explored on its own. Pre-1990 attempts to 
enable market dynamics to determine the securitization of African issues failed. 
Aning (2000:31) states that it is owing to the bipolar nature of international relations 
that the bipolarity established a spurious sense of ethics and morality in 
international relations and continued to be informed by the disreputable notion of 
mercenary activities, despite the privatisation of the security/military industry. 
 
The recent war of the “coalition of the willing” in Iraq demonstrates the PMC/F 
industry is growing activity. The coalition was made up of mainly the USA and the 
UK, but also of Australia, Poland, Romania, Palau, Netherlands, Costa Rica, 
Iceland and Afghanistan. Private contractors, rather than the military, benefited 
from the outsourcing and civilianising of military and security functions in war-torn 
Iraq. This became a very lucrative marketplace for a special type of PMC. They are 
allowed to do so, because their functions are aligned with the national security 
interests of the major partners (USA and UK). “Indeed, the ratio of private 
contractors to US military personnel in the Gulf is roughly one to ten, ten times the 
ratio during the 1991 (Gulf) war” (Bredemeier, 2003:E01). 
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Aning et al (2004) ask the questions: “is it legitimate to hire the services of a 
mercenary to train a state’s military once the mercenary is not involved in any act 
of hostility?”, and “would a government be violating its compliance with CEMA by 
contracting the services of a mercenary group to maintain its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty in an armed conflict with a sub-state actor group?” 
 
The less immediate question is whether these PMCs can evolve into something 
controllable and within the rules of the states or organizations that hire them? One 
can be certain that the larger powers will resort to legal constraints where PMCs 
are becoming too threatening or influential? The effectiveness of PMCs must, 
however, not be underestimated. According to Brooks & Solomon (2000:33), PMCs 
have proven their ability to push low intensity conflicts to settlements, and they 
have shown their willingness to enter, and end seemingly intractable conflicts, 
where superpowers were reluctant to enter or where Security Council members 
simply vetoed international intervention. 
 
Singer (2004b:535) emphasises this point in saying that PMCs, being service-
orientated businesses, operating on a global scale and consisting of small 
infrastructures, have the ability to transform and circumvent legislation, or escape 
prosecution. A further point of concern is the lack of co-operation between the 
states and international organisations to enforce and implement regulations made 
to regulate and monitor PMCs. A workable regulation solution for PMCs must 
therefore be created, by taking into account all the relevant laws and information 
that deal with this polemical topic. 
 
There are, however, a large variety of PMC involvements in the African context 
whose outcomes may differ. This study does not regard EO and the MPRI as the 
only PMCs operating in Africa. Other PMCs are referred to throughout the study 
where relevant and where further substantiation is needed to prove or disprove 
certain claims. The two case studies (Executive Outcomes in Angola and MPRI in 
Equatorial Guinea) are used to shed light on PMC operations. The need to 
establish a regulatory framework to serve as international guidelines under which 
PMCs must operate is crucial to the debate, and all the current laws and treaties 
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 and relevant information are assessed. The problem that warrants the study 
therefore is whether PMCs can be turned into something useful (such as 
peacemakers) through better regulation and whether such legislation will be 
sufficient. 
 
1.2  Purpose and significance of the study 
 
This thesis evaluates and explores the function of Private Military Companies on 
the African continent and helps in creating a better understanding of the workings 
of PMCs in Africa. Why Africa? “Man developed in Africa. He has not continued to 
do so there” (O’Rourke, 1987:3). Adams (2002:58) states that the rapid growth of 
these PMCs strongly suggested that nation states might be losing their monopoly 
over military means. This could indeed be very worrying since the modern state 
has the right to employ force and especially deadly force through military means. 
Some observers state that any compromise of that monopoly would be very 
significant indeed (Howe, 1997). Spearin (2000) also states that gone are the 
assumptions that in the weak state environment, the host government would be 
willing or able to provide security for the populace, let alone ensure that 
humanitarian operations would be able to proceed relatively unmolested. 
 
The purpose of this study is also to assess whether PMCs can be held accountable 
(McIntyre, 2004) and to whom: the international community, home states, host 
states (or the masters of profit, perhaps crime syndicates). The real question that 
arises in the purpose of this thesis is whether proper regulation can make them 
legitimate. The issue cannot be profits alone, because if that were the case there 
would be no place for multinational corporations anywhere in the world whose main 
aim is to generate profit for shareholders. The distinction is made between the 
workings of the advice, training and providing specialised services types of PMCs 
and the combat types of PMCs. This is done to determine if there are similarities in 
the workings of PMCs in Africa. However, all PMCs are controversial, none the 
more so than the combat types which invite comparisons with mercenaries. In 
modern law there is no place for mercenaries. 
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 The focal points of this thesis are therefore: 
 
1. The description of the origin and types of PMCs. 
2. The comparison of the services that PMCs supply to that of traditional 
mercenaries. 
3. The analysis of the current regulations regarding PMCs and mercenaries, 
focusing on those regulations of the supplying countries, hosting countries, 
international organisations, and regional organisations. 
4. The assessment of the involvement of PMCs in Africa (specifically in Angola 
and Equatorial Guinea owing to their similar littoral position in Africa, oil-driven 
economy and well documented PMC involvement). 
5. A conclusion stating whether legislation, extraterritorial applications of 
legislation, and the regulatory framework are sufficient and whether PMCs 
could add value to peacekeeping on the African continent if regulated 
effectively. 
 
The above-mentioned focus areas are approached and substantiated by the 
chapters of the thesis in the following way: 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the topic and also includes the problem statement of the 
thesis together with the purpose, significance and research methodology. The 
concept of Private Military Companies is categorised into three types, namely 
Mercenaries and PMCs, specialised non-combat services also referred to as 
Private Security Companies (PSCs) and lastly combat services. Chapter one also 
explains that the topic is explored in an unbiased, objective manner, without falling 
trap to normative statements or claims. One could argue that it is impossible to 
practice value-free research in the social science and that even the topic and the 
approach, although not consciously done, could be based on normative 
considerations. Academic sources are used to evaluate the subject matter and the 
application of relevant information on the topic is used extensively. 
 
Chapter 2 deals with the regulatory framework regarding PMCs and mercenaries. 
The objective of this chapter is to bring to light the need to regulate PMCs in Africa 
and worldwide, by focusing on the international (Geneva and UN conventions) and 
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 regional (AU, SADC) arena, and the countries (USA, RSA, Angola and Equatorial 
Guinea) involved in this study regulations that deal with the subject matter of PMCs 
and mercenaries. This needs to be done to determine if legislation is adequate, 
has reached its sell-by date and where and how it can be improved if possible. 
 
Chapter 3 touches on one of the most well-known Private Military Companies, 
namely Executive Outcomes (as a combat type) and their involvement in Angola. 
This chapter conceptualises the problem statement and takes a look at the 
concepts of traditional mercenaries and private armies or Private Military 
Companies. The functions they fulfil in establishing peace and/or maintaining 
peace on an African context. This is necessary to test the validity of claims made 
by Executive Outcomes on effectively establishing peace in Angola. 
 
Chapter 4 focuses on a second type of PMC, namely MPRI and its involvement in 
Equatorial Guinea. The MPRI is very closely linked to the US government and this 
study tries to establish if the MPRI is aligning its ventures with US national interest. 
MPRI claims to provide specialised services, advice and logistical support.  Its 
involvement in Equatorial Guinea and the reason why some Western Governments 
find PMCs acceptable are examined. 
 
Chapter 5 serves as a concluding chapter in which all the findings are assessed to 
help in exploring further studies on the functions of private military companies in 
Africa, effective regulatory ideas, the functions of peacekeepers (UN’s security legs 
that are overstretched) or plunderers for profits, and the escalation of multinational 
companies’ interests. Are these PMCs effective? Is regulation sufficient? What are 
their advantages and disadvantages, and how will they be effective in the future 
and in which kind of operations? 
 
1.3  Research methodology 
 
This is a literature survey that seeks descriptive and comparative information 
relevant to the purpose of this study. It deals with that information qualitatively. No 
empirical research has been conducted. It is therefore not an opinion survey as no 
questionnaires have been completed, although interviews with knowledgeable 
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 people have been conducted. Newspapers and highly regarded academic 
resources have been used in the study of the workings of PMCs on the African 
continent. 
 
The topic of this study is very polemical (especially where dealing with the combat 
types) and controversial. It is therefore important to be unbiased and as objective 
as possible. Through analysing the position of PMCs in Africa, the strengths and 
weaknesses have been evaluated to assist in issuing a balanced assessment. This 
was done by relying on relevant academic sources especially the work by Cilliers & 
Mason (1999) regarding the privatisation of security in war-torn African societies, 
Shearer (1998b) on Private armies and military intervention, Arnold (1999) 
regarding mercenaries and the third world, McIntyre (2004) on Private military firms 
in Africa: rogue or regulated. 
 
Apart from the research about the function of PMCs in Africa, attention is focused 
on international law, the UN and other conventions, the laws of home countries 
such as the RSA, and the USA, and also the laws – if they exist, of host countries 
such as Angola and Equatorial Guinea. This might bring clarity to the questions 
about regulation. Although legislation was reviewed in 2005 in South Africa, the 
focus in this study is only on the Foreign Military Assistance Act, 1998 (Act No. 15 
of 1998). Limitations of the study further includes the lack of information from 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea on mercenaries and PMCs and the regulation 
thereof. 
 
1.4  Concepts 
 
1.4.1  Mercenaries, Private Military Companies or Private Military Firms 
(PMCs/PMFs) and Private Security Firms 
 
The origin of and the rationale behind the concept of PMC will be explained in 
detail. This study explores why the concept of PMC differs vastly from that of 
mercenaries or “dogs of war”, by exploring the definitions of the above-mentioned 
concepts as summarised in an international, regional and national framework. De 
Coning (2006:11) recommends that the use of the term Private Military Companies 
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 (PMCs) be restricted to those who offer offensive security services and the term 
Private Security Companies (PSCs) to those who offer defensive security services. 
There are also companies that specialise in providing logistical and support 
services, and also companies that offer all of the above-mentioned. “From a UN, 
AU or national Government perspective it is important to make this distinction, 
because while some non-lethal logistical and other support services are 
increasingly being outsourced to ‘private contractors’ in the UN and AU peace 
operations, it is highly unlikely that the UN or AU will outsource those aspects of 
peace operations that may involve lethal force” (De Coning, 2006:11). 
 
1.4.2  Are PMCs mercenaries in disguise? 
 
PMCs are here to stay since more and more departments of governments are 
being privatised. PMCs will always wangle themselves into a new robe or uniform 
but beyond that, are they “different sauce but same meat?” There is a significant 
presence of PMCs in Africa (Leander, 2004:7) supplying the demand to fill the 
security gap (Mandel, 2002) and looking after certain countries’ national interests 
(for example oil) by trying to bring stability to the areas they are contracted to. 
Isenberg (2000) mentions that PMCs are trying to break into new markets and 
obtain new resources, as well as protect existing infrastructure in areas often 
troubled by violence. 
 
With more and more companies who consider themselves as private security 
companies and who want to shake the tarnished image and distinguish them from 
mercenaries or so-called “guns for hire”, it is important to try to establish their 
standing on the scale of international law. Jackson (2002:38) states that PMCs and 
Private Security firms are more or less the same but that PMCs are prepared to 
participate in combat situations. Sandoz (1999:201) goes even further and states 
that proper investigation of these private security firms is necessary to determine if 
they are compatible with international law. If so, do they also meet the 
requirements and more precise framework of the international humanitarian law? 
Why then do they need to meet the requirements? Jackson (2002:39) considers it 
to be twofold: to control undesirable activities such as mercenarism and human 
rights abuses and to make PMCs accountable for their activities and also the 
countries that acquire their services. 
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O’Brien (2000) concurs that PMCs are not mercenaries, nor are they the ”new 
mercenaries” (as often referred to); this could only be the case if mercenarism had 
disappeared entirely, which it hasn’t. Mercenaries, in the true sense of the word, 
are still actively (Sage, 1999) fighting for financial gain and conspiring to oust 
governments, for example the “White Legion” during the 1996-1997 Zairian conflict 
(O’Brien, 2000). Therefore it would not be completely fair to brand PMCs as the 
“new mercenaries”. EO has claimed that it did not conduct mercenary activities. 
Regardless of the semantic definitions one prefers hired foreign troops who 
conduct offensive operations and receive salaries from private contractors in 
excess of any national defence force’s pay, are mercenaries (Pech, 1999:104). 
 
Today's PMCs are unlike the mercenaries of a few decades ago (Weinberg, 1995). 
“Many of today's companies exhibit a distinct corporate nature and a desire for 
good public relations. The companies' goal of obtaining contracts encourages them 
to control their employees' actions. Private firms have a large pool of qualified 
applicants, due to worldwide political realignments and defence cutbacks since 
1989 ...” (Isenberg, 2000). O’Brien (2000) agrees on how PMCs differ from 
mercenaries in that “they (PMCs) are organised along corporate lines (including 
boards of directors, share-holdings, and corporate structures), their work has a 
clear contractual aim and obligation to their clients, and they engage in military 
operations – across the spectrum where necessary”.  
 
PMCs have a unique and remarkable ability to act as a force multiplier, working 
with local forces and nullifying problems of scale. PMCs can be used to pacify 
areas of ethnic tension, provide peacekeeping services, oversee truce monitoring 
operations, protect NGO programmes, undertake humanitarian rescue operations, 
and if necessary, even conclude wars decisively (Brooks &Solomon, 2000:33). 
 
Kwok (2006) concurs that the typical PMC employee is not a direct descendant of 
the mercenary of the past. Pejoratively labelled the "whores of war" or the "soldiers 
of fortune," personnel from private military companies (PMCs) have been receiving 
undue negative media attention because their duties seem so similar to 
mercenaries of the old-fashioned variety. PMC employees do not work for multiple 
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 employers at once and are not officially assigned to direct combat situations. 
O’Brien (2000) states that privatised policing and private and commercial security 
have been seen in most Western societies as an acceptable capability for a state 
to have. Private military operations should not be seen as being different and 
therefore, not be regulated any differently  to these two predecessors. 
 
It should be noted that the Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the 
Geneva Conventions definition of a mercenary is cumulative, i.e. a mercenary is 
defined as someone to whom all of the above (see 2.2) apply. Sandoz (1999:209) 
states that international law recognises a role for civilian support specialists on the 
battlefield which specifically precludes their inclusion as mercenaries. This results 
in the international recognition that private military organisations are not 
mercenaries and are in fact legitimate national corporations organised in 
accordance with the legal codes of their respective home countries (Sandoz, 
1999:209). 
 
Shearer (1998b:18) shares this view and states that if contracted “help/fighters” 
become members of the countries’ military they will avoid being branded as 
mercenaries. Article 47 does not apply in a civil war (a major concern) and several 
large international role players (US and France) are not parties to the agreement 
(''Protocol Additional GC 1977'' (APGC77) (Shearer, 1998b:19). 
 
The above definitions and criteria applied to PMCs could allow for problems to 
occur in proving the motivation of someone accused of mercenary activities. 
Shearer (1998b:18) states that especially the requirement that mercenaries take a 
direct part in hostilities, as required by sub-paragraph (b) of Article 47 of the First 
Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions, would therefore exclude 
individuals acting as foreign military advisers and technicians. Therefore MPRI and 
DynCorp are excluded. Adams (2002:61) also mentions that the convention only 
applies in situations of international armed conflict. One can therefore question the 
effectiveness because according to the United Nations Report on the Question of 
the use of Mercenaries as a Means of impeding the exercise of the right of peoples 
to self-determination, most mercenary activity is in intrastate conflicts. Under the 
Geneva Convention, if a soldier is captured by an enemy, he/she must be treated 
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 as a lawful combatant and therefore a ''Protected Person'' which for a soldier is as 
a Prisoner of War (POW) until the soldier has faced a competent tribunal (GC III 
Art. 5). 
 
That tribunal may decide that the person is a mercenary using a criterion in 
APGC77 or some domestic law equivalent. At that point the mercenary becomes 
an unlawful combatant but must still be ''treated with humanity and, in case of trial, 
shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial", because he/she is still 
covered by the fourth Geneva Convention Article 5. The only exception to GC IV 
Art 5 is if he/she is a national of the authority which is holding him/her but in which 
case he/she would not be a mercenary under APGC77 Art 47.d. 
 
While the United States governed the country, US citizens who worked as armed 
guards could not be called mercenaries because they were ''nationals of a party to 
the conflict'' (APGC77 Art 47.d). With the handover of power to the interim Iraqi 
government it could be argued that unless they declared that they were residents 
in Iraq, i.e. ''residents of territory controlled by a party to the conflict'' (APGC77 Art 
47.d), they were now mercenaries. It should be noted that coalition soldiers in Iraq 
who are supporting the interim Iraqi government are not mercenaries, because 
either they are part of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or they have been 
''sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty as a member of 
its armed forces'' (APGC77 Art 47.f). 
 
Distinguishing between mercenarism and private military is a step in the right 
direction. The whole industry will render itself to become more transparent, instead 
of tumbling into grey areas of technicalities. According to O’Brian (2002), this Act  
is, despite its faults and limitations, a strong example to build on in the UK. South 
African legislation regulates both the existence of the companies (by forcing them 
to be licensed to operate) and their operations (by making them seek licensed 
approval for each contract undertaken). The aim is to ensure that the companies 
are monitored after they have been authorised, as well as ensuring that they are 
individually licensed for the types of services they wish to provide (Creehan, 2002). 
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 Mercenaries: 
 
Aning quotes Nathan (1997) who defines mercenaries as soldiers hired by a 
foreign government or rebel movement to contribute to the prosecution of armed 
conflict, whether directly by engaging in hostilities or indirectly through training, 
logistics intelligence or advisory services and who do so outside the authority of the 
government and defence force of their country (Aning, 2000:30). The Concise 
Oxford English Dictionary (1991) defines a mercenary as “a professional soldier 
serving a foreign power”. This is a very broad definition which could also include 
various legal forces such as the Swiss Guard and the Ghurkha Soldiers. Brayton 
(2002:306) defines mercenaries as soldiers who are “foreign to the conflict”, 
“motivated chiefly by financial gain”, and “in some cases they participate directly in 
combat.” 
 
Mercenaries are usually zealous adventurers, fighting for money and do not have a 
very high regard for laws. They just want to get the job done, using whatever 
means they deem necessary to achieve the goals, and to get paid and to get out. 
The difference between PMCs and Mercenaries, according to Brooks & Solomon 
(2000:34), is that PMCs behave like normal companies. Their primary motivation is 
long-term profit, and they are constrained by domestic and international laws. 
Freelance mercenaries are motivated by short-term profit or a sense of adventure. 
They are often stateless and show little regard for rule of law. These differences 
are critical. 
 
PMCs/PMFs: 
 
The two types of PMCs that the study focuses on are the combat type of PMCs 
and PMCs that provide specialised non-combat services, also referred to as 
Private Security Companies (PSCs). Harris & Moller (2004:35) state that three 
types of services may be offered by PMCs: combat services, advice and training, 
and specialised services (for example airborne surveillance and signal interception) 
with military application. 
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 Smith (2002:104) states that PMCs are different from other private means of 
violence (such as terrorism and warlordism) in scope, purpose and legal form. 
Smith (2002) also states that they differ significantly, for example, from 
mercenaries, the familiar soldier for hire. Mercenaries actively take part in conflict 
for financial gain, where it is claimed that PMCs do not actively take part in conflict. 
According to Smith (2002:105), world events in the early 2000s publicised another 
means of privatised conflict – the private militia or army lead by a warlord, and they 
are just a step above the traditional mercenary. One of the biggest challenges 
facing the policy- and lawmakers is to define PMCs (especially the combat types) 
and mercenaries clearly.  
 
Shearer (1998b:21) states that PMCs advertise their services and are legally 
registered (often in an offshore tax haven), and that PMC personnel are employed 
within a defined structure, with established terms and conditions, and work with a 
degree of organisation and accountability to the company. The company, in turn, is 
answerable to its client, often under a legally binding contract. 
 
PMCs' contractors are civilians (in governments, international and non-
governmental organizations) authorized to accompany a force in the field. Hence 
the terminology "civilian contractor" is sometimes used. PMCs may use force, and 
can therefore be defined as: "legally established enterprises that make a profit by 
either providing services involving the potential exercise of force in a systematic 
way and by military means, and/or by the transfer of that potential to clients through 
training and other practices, such as logistics support, equipment procurement, and 
intelligence gathering" (http://www.privatemilitary.org/definition.html / Ortiz, C. last 
revised 24 June 2007). The term "potential" is used because the mere presence of 
a PMC can deter aggressors from considering the use of force as a viable course 
of action. A PMC does not have to play an actual or potential military role; a PMC's 
involvement may well be directed towards enhancing the recipient's military and 
security capabilities. (Ortiz, 2004:206) 
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Private Security Firms: 
 
According to Harris & Moller (2004:34), privatisation of security can have a number 
of meanings. It can mean private security company personnel employed to protect 
economic assets owned by a government or transnational company, or to advise 
and train the local military. It can also include the transfer of non-core activities 
currently undertaken by the military to other government departments or civilian 
bodies (civilianisation).  
 
In Angola, for example, the government makes it a requirement for foreign 
investors that they provide their own security – usually by hiring a private company. 
Their job is similar to that done by security companies in the domestic context; 
some estimates suggest that the ratio of private security guards to police in 
developed countries is 3:1. In less developed countries it may be 10:1 or more. 
Where companies provide services overseas this will usually be through a local 
subsidiary subject to local law (Straw, 2002). 
 
1.4.3  Training provided by PMCs 
 
Training is a major service provided by PMCs. In some cases it may be linked to 
combat – as was the case with EO’s training in Angola and Sierra Leone. Or it may 
be free standing. Companies like MPRI, DynCorp and Vinnell fall in this category 
and have close links with their home government (the US) and regard themselves 
as normal and legitimate businesses, providing a specialised service to their 
clientele. Advice may cover anything from advice on restructuring the armed forces 
to advice on purchasing of equipment or on operational planning. They (MPRI in 
Bosnia and Vinnell in Saudi Arabia) provide specialised training for national and 
palace guards or troops (Misser & Versi, 1997:12 and Zagorin, 1997:48). 
 
1.4.4  Specialised non-combat services also referred to as Private Security 
Companies (PSCs) 
 
These categorised PMCs/PSCs provide security services (that include airborne 
surveillance and signal interception) abroad for companies, governments and for 
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 other bodies, including the UN and some NGOs. Falling in this category and 
referred to as PSCs, it can be difficult to distinguish them from PMCs. An 
illustration – admittedly an extreme one – of the way in which functions may merge 
is provided by the case of the Ghurkha Security Guards who actively took part in 
combat in Sierra Leone (Straw, 2002). 
 
Brayton (2002:308) describes PSCs as companies that provide highly specialised 
services with military application, although these groups are themselves not 
primarily military or paramilitary in organization or in method. Although members of 
such an organization may not necessarily have military experience or training, they 
possess skills and abilities with military and also civilian use. These companies 
according to Brayton (2002) are smaller than PMCs and they perform functions 
such as personal protection, signal interception, computer cracking, secure 
communications and technical surveillance. These types of services are carried out 
by US companies like MPRI and DynCorp. Smith (2005:22) states that PSCs are 
restricted to bodyguard work, protecting buildings and pipelines. Recently a 
number of private security companies have become involved in fisheries protection, 
or in training for protection against pirates. Both of these tasks might equally well 
be undertaken by private military companies (Straw, 2002). 
 
1.4.5  The combat type of PMC 
 
This category is very controversial because of the similarities with mercenaries. 
The international community feels that taking directly part in hostilities implies that 
there is a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the harm 
done to the enemy at the time and place where that activity takes place (Sandoz, 
1999:209). Smith (2005:22) sees PMCs as companies that not only train soldiers 
(see above), but that also undertake offensive operations. EO and Sandline 
International fit into this category. 
 
It is widely documented that EO and Sandline International did actively take part in 
hostilities in Sierra Leone and Angola. Cilliers & Mason (1999:2) state that EO was 
a radical form of privatisation of security in Africa and was an extension of more 
legitimate personal protection services. Spicer (1999) argues that PMCs are 
defined as those organisations which do more than provide passive assistance in 
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 areas of conflict. O’Brian (2000:62) states that PMCs represent the ultimate 
evolution of private means of violence and defines a PMC as “a legally chartered 
company or organisation organised along business lines and engaged in military 
operations across the spectrum of conflict”. 
 
Cilliers & Mason (1999:2) state that “companies such as Executive Outcomes and 
Sandline International transcend the role of traditional security consultants – they 
are, in fact, private paramilitary organisations which style themselves as ‘military 
consultants’. They employ former soldiers and, in many of their activities, act in a 
manner indistinguishable from classic mercenaries at the behest of their economic 
or political paymasters.” “We offer a variety of services to legitimate governments, 
including infantry training, clandestine warfare, counterintelligence programmes 
[cointelpro], reconnaissance, escape and evasion, special forces selection and 
training and even parachuting,” adds Barlow (1998). PMCs are structured and have 
a responsibility to themselves to keep their act together if they do want future 
contracts, whereas mercenaries are without that corporate structure and pressure 
to keep their slate clean for future work. 
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CHAPTER 2:  REGULATORY FRAMEWORK REGARDING PMCs 
 
2.1  Establishing a workable regulatory framework 
 
In the 1960s mercenaries became notorious in Africa, especially in the Congo, and 
were regarded as an offspring of colonial powers. It is, however, in Africa that the 
PMCs thrived and prospered although there were laws that prohibited them from 
operating on this continent. It is important to mention that relevant regulators 
regarding the topic define mercenaries, but not PMCs, therefore creating a legal 
loophole by not defining PMCs. This is critical to the debate, since there are 
differences between PMCs and mercenaries. There are also differences in the 
definitions of conflict and humanitarian intervention. According to Cilliers 
(2005:120) the problem with the debate on “guns for hire” is that it is increasingly 
difficult to draw the line between legitimate government contracts to outsource 
specific aspects of the application and support of armed forces, and mercenary 
activity by foreign nationals with financial motives. 
 
The involvement of Executive Outcomes as a combat type of PMC and other 
PMCs, such as MPRI operating in Africa, brought along interesting discussions on 
challenges regarding peacekeeping and the security industry in general. Using 
paid military forces is, however, not a new phenomenon in war. The word soldier is 
derived from the word ”soulde” meaning ”pay”; a ”commission” and was in effect a 
contract to hire men. Even Alexander the Great and Hannibal employed mercenary 
forces. In Europe many commanders preferred them to recruited forces until the 
creation of national armies in the 19th century. 
(http://www.ippnw.org/MGS/V7N2Selber.pdf /Author unknown) 
 
The purpose of the international humanitarian law, according to Sandoz 
(1999:201), is to preserve a measure of humanity during the conduct of war. The 
bottom line of the problem is that the regulatory and legal issues that deal with 
PMCs are very vague, and the archaic definitions and regulations (that of 
mercenaries) are not applicable to this modern day phenomenon of privatising 
armies and providing security services. Warfare has seriously changed rapidly, an 
example being the bombings in New York on 11 September 2001. To succeed in 
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 its goal to preserve a measure of humanity during the conduct of war, the 
international humanitarian law therefore needs to be amended to cater for new 
phenomena in war, for example PMCs and terrorism conducted by cell-groups and 
faceless enemies. 
 
Ideally, there would be no cause for PMCs and their staff getting involved in legal 
cases and everybody will respect the rule of law, but unfortunately and realistically 
that is not the case. PMCs are often criticised owing to their apparent immunity to 
legal challenges. They often work for weak states that are loath to risk losing the 
security provided by the PMCs, and are thus willing to overlook isolated criminal 
acts. While PMCs are generally subject to the laws of their home countries, legal 
challenges have been rare. A more effective legal framework would help legitimise 
the operations of PMCs and encourage co-operation by actors who have 
previously shunned private soldiers. When drawing up guidelines, it is important 
that PMCs be allowed a good deal of latitude in their operations, but within the 
parameters of law. 
 
The 1907 Hague Convention on Neutral Powers is perhaps the earliest formalised 
convention regarding international war laws in a modern state system (Singer, 
2004b:526). Whilst the convention vested certain legal rights in neutral parties and 
persons in war, it neglected to impose on states any sanction to restrict their own 
nationals from working for other parties or foreign powers. Nationals for hire did not 
commit an international crime and were treated like indigenous soldiers (Hague 
Convention 1907). With the Hague Convention not making provision for PMCs 
there is a serious gap in the regulatory framework. There are, however, restrictions 
on soldiers for hire. Sandoz (1999:206) states that a private company can lawfully 
provide support for a struggle against a government only if, within the framework of 
the UN, both the illegitimacy of the government and the legitimacy of those 
engaged in the struggle are indisputably acknowledged. Sandoz (1999:206) 
mentions that if the territory of a state is entered without the government’s consent 
it will be a violation of sovereignty. The problem is that the UN is very cautious 
when ruling on a government’s legitimacy. The lacklustre viewpoint of the UN does 
not, however, entitle private entities to decide if support given to any one of the role 
players is just or lawful. 
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McIntyre (2004:103) states that little has been done in the way of developing 
regulatory frameworks for the private military industry that could effectively prevent 
PMCs from going rogue. Perhaps most significantly, according to McIntyre (2004), 
many PMCs are anxious to see the development of rational regulatory frameworks 
and are willing to submit to the monitoring of their activities. The development of 
benchmarks for good (and ethical) business practice opens the doors for the 
legitimisation of firms and thus more contract opportunities, but also for the civil 
oversight of the industry. 
 
According to Arnold (1999:123) “a high point of anti-mercenary sentiment was 
achieved when western mercenaries captured in Angola early in 1976 were put on 
trial later that year in the presence of eminent jurists and observers from around 
the world. Subsequently, there were few protests when the leading mercenaries 
were executed and others received long prison sentences and no one argued that 
they had been punished unfairly.” Although mercenaries changed their image and 
opted for a clean cut, corporate look, legislation has not yet caught up regarding 
mercenaries.  
 
For the purpose of this study the focus is only on the Geneva Conventions, Article 
47 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977, Article 1(1) of the AU Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA) adopted from the OAU Convention for 
the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa of 1977, the US Arms Export Control Act 
of 1968, the Foreign Military Assistance Act of the Republic of South Africa of 1998 
the UN General Assembly in 1973, adopted Resolution 3103 with the title: Basic 
principles of the legal status of the combatants struggling against colonial and alien 
domination and racist regimes and The UN International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use and Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 1989. 
 
2.2  Geneva Conventions regarding PMCs and Mercenaries 
 
Article 47 of the First Additional Protocol of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions 
defines a mercenary as one whom: 
(a) is specifically recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict; 
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 (b) does, in fact, take direct part in the hostilities; 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a party to the conflict, 
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that party; 
(d) is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a party to the conflict; 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict; and 
(f) has not been sent by a state which is not a party to the conflict on official duty 
as a member of the armed forces. 
 
It could be argued that the convention and APGC77 Art. 47 are designed to cover 
the activities of mercenaries in post colonial Africa, and do not adequately address 
the use of private military companies by sovereign states. 
 
2.3  The UN conventions, treaties and regulations regarding PMCs and 
Mercenaries 
 
The first attempt by the UN to condemn the use of mercenaries against movements 
of national liberation was named Declaration on Principles of International law 
concerning Friendly relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations (1970). This declaration, although condemning 
mercenaries, placed the enforcement duties on states. The problems regarding this 
declaration are similar to the ones that are dealt with today, mainly the apathy or 
inability of states to deal with the issue. The UN International Convention against 
the Recruitment, Use and Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 1989 is a 
further attempt by the United Nations to outlaw all mercenary activities. At first only 
19 out of the requisite 22 states have ratified or acceded to this convention, until 
2001 when the necessary signatures were added (Adams, 2002:62). 
 
The UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and 
Training of Mercenaries (1989) was drafted to protect states from the unlawful use 
or threat of force against their political independence and territorial integrity. It fails 
to define PMCs but it is the only international instrument applicable to both 
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 mercenaries and PMCs, though it does not ban mercenarism outright, only those 
activities that undermine a state’s political stability or territorial integrity (Beyani & 
Lilly, 2001:27). 
 
The U.N. International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries 1989 defines a mercenary as any person who 
 
• is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of participating in a 
concerted act of violence aimed at: overthrowing a government or otherwise 
undermining the constitutional order of a state, or undermining the territorial 
integrity of a state; 
• is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for significant private 
gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of material compensation; 
• is neither a national nor a resident of the state against which such an act is 
directed; 
• has not been sent by a state on official duty; and 
• is not a member of the armed forces of the state on whose territory the act is 
undertaken. 
(International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries, 1989) 
 
The UN conventions and legislation fails to define PMCs and only defines 
mercenaries. The Brahimi Report (2000) underscores this fact and describes the 
United Nations' inability to bring more men, money, and thought to the mission of 
peacekeeping. Although the understaffing of the UN secretariat is not completely 
relevant to the regulation of PMCs, the latter, if thoroughly regulated, could fill 
these shortages in the peacekeeping sectors. The report thus reveals the extent to 
which today the UN Secretariat is under-staffed and under-funded. At the time the 
report was completed (July 2000) the DPKO had only 32 military officers to plan, 
recruit, equip, deploy, support, and direct some 27 000 soldiers that comprised the 
15 missions underway. UN police forces faced a similar situation: staffs of only nine 
police officers working out of UN headquarters were called upon to support 8 000 
UN police in the field. The report thus concluded that the DPKO administrative 
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 budget (which was equal to 1/50th of the field teams' budget) was utterly 
insufficient to support the teams in the field. 
(http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm /Brahimi,L, July 
2000). 
 
These sobering numbers illustrate the core of the report. The United Nations 
currently lacks the resources to effectively maintain its peacekeeping mission. This 
also illustrates clearly the UN's lack of independence and inability to take command 
where international crisis situations occur. Another factor crucial to the success of 
UN missions is the ongoing political support of influential member states. While the 
Brahimi Report fails to address this final point, participants drove home the 
fundamental importance of gaining international support (especially from the United 
States) for UN missions. 
 
Participants illustrated the cross-cutting character of this issue: (1) "All the 
recommendations contained in Brahimi for improving UN peacekeeping activities 
depend on the will of the U.S. Congress to fund the program,'' (2) "There is a 
consistent undercurrent within the UN of dissatisfaction and disappointment with 
U.S. failure to support the institution," and (3) this dynamic is "eroding America's 
international standing." 
(http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm /Brahimi, L. July 
2000) 
 
In summary, the rationale behind the Brahimi Report (2000) is threefold: (1) to 
underscore the growing need for peacekeepers around the world, (2) to bring to 
light the UN's failure to ramp up administrative and logistical support of 
peacekeepers in the field, and (3) to propose a series of changes to improve the 
effectiveness of the DPKO. 
(http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm /Brahimi, L. July 
2000) 
 
The Brahimi Report (2000) does not contain any reference to PMCs. This could 
imply that the UN denies the use of PMCs, or that the UN wants to keep that alley 
of employing PMCs open for further exploration. The UN General Assembly in 
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 1973, adopted Resolution 3103 that states “The use of mercenaries by colonial 
and racist regimes against the national liberation movements’ struggling for their 
freedom and independence from the yoke of colonialism and alien domination is 
considered to be a criminal act and these mercenaries should accordingly be 
punished as criminals.” 
 
2.4  The OAU/AU conventions regarding PMCs and Mercenaries 
 
The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (1977, entered 
into force in 1985) is another international instrument in force specifically applicable 
to mercenary activity. It, however, fails to define PMCs. PMCs are not regulated by 
the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. (Musah & Fayemi, 
2002:36) 
 
The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa of 1977 provides 
an alternative definition in article 1. Article 1(1) of the AU Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA) defines a mercenary as any person 
who 
 
• is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict, 
•  does in fact take a direct part in the hostilities, 
• is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private 
gain and in fact is promised material compensation by or on behalf of a party to 
the conflict, 
• is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled 
by a party to the conflicts, 
• is not a member of the armed forces of a party to the conflict, and 
• is not sent by a state other than a party to the conflict on an official mission as a 
member of the armed forces of the said state. 
(OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. Libreville, 1977.) 
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 2.5  South African laws regarding PMCs and Mercenaries 
 
South Africa forms part of the African Peer Review Mechanism but has not yet 
ratified the OAU/AU convention against mercenaries (Aning, Addo, Birikorang & 
Sowatey, 2004:60). South Africa, however, drafted and enacted the Foreign 
Military Assistance Act, 1998 (Act No. 15 of 1998), to eradicate mercenarism. 
According to Aning et al (2004:60) the reason for South Africa’s non-ratification of 
CEMA is that it clashes with the more recent UN obligations and has also 
experienced constitutional problems in translating its OAU/AU commitments into 
domestic legislation. 
 
The said Act, however, broadens the definitions of mercenaries and PMCs as 
follows: 
 
(iii)  ‘‘foreign military assistance’’ means military services or military-related 
services, or any attempt, encouragement, incitement or solicitation to render such 
services, in the form of – 
(a) military assistance to a party to the armed conflict by means of – 
 (i) advice or training; 
 (ii) personnel, financial, logistical, intelligence or operational support; 
 (iii) personnel recruitment; 
 (iv) medical or paramedical services; or 
 (v) procurement of equipment; 
(b) security services for the protection of individuals involved in armed conflict or 
their property; 
(c) any action aimed at overthrowing a government or undermining the  
constitutional order, sovereignty or territorial integrity of a state; 
(d) any other action that has the result of furthering the military interests of  a party 
to the armed conflict, but not humanitarian or civilian activities aimed at relieving 
the plight of civilians in an area of armed conflict; (i) 
(iv)  ‘‘mercenary activity’’ means direct participation as a combatant in armed 
conflict for private gain; (iii) 
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 The said Act regulates rather than prohibits foreign military assistance. Requests to 
supply such assistance and all arms-related materials are scrutinised by the 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) which is chaired by a 
Minister from a government department that has no direct links with the defence 
industry. The NCACC performs oversight functions in relation to the intelligence 
and counterintelligence functions of security agencies. The committee has the 
power to refuse an application, or to grant a licence. Decisions are based on 
principles of international legislation, including human rights legislation. Licences 
may be revoked should there be a change in circumstances in the recipient state. 
The first successful prosecutions under the Act occurred early in 2004 when a 
South African helicopter pilot was found guilty of contravening the Act and 
sentenced to a fine (Aning et al, 2004:63). 
 
2.6  United States laws regarding PMCs and Mercenaries 
 
The Neutrality Act of 1794 made it a misdemeanour for an individual to prepare or 
depart for a conflict abroad. A new Neutrality Act in 1937 was introduced, but is 
interpreted according to Shearer (1998b:20) as only prohibiting the recruitment of 
mercenaries within the US, and being a mercenary is not in itself a criminal 
offence. Smith (2002:112) mentions that as the government hires the PMCs to act 
as the formers agents, the Neutrality Act is not violated. 
 
According to Goddard (2001:18) the term "private military company" does not exist 
within any extant or emerging US joint or service doctrine. Goddard (2001) states 
that the nearest comparative operational term within the US Army doctrine is that of 
"contractor" that is detailed within developing the US Army Logistics doctrine. The 
definition and roles of "battlefield contractors" are detailed within the US Army 
publications Army Regulations (AR) 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force 
(1999); Field manual (FM) 100-21, Contractors on the Battlefield (1999); FM 100-
10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield (1999); and FM 63-11, and 
Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet (PAM) 715-16, Contractor Deployment 
Guide (1998). The US Army Regulation 715-9 is the definitive document that 
delineates between the actions of contractors and PMCs. This regulation states 
that contractors can perform potentially any function on the battlefield except 
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 inherent governmental functions (Goddard, 2001:18). Inherent governmental 
functions are defined as those "necessary for the sustainment of combat 
operations, that are performed under combat conditions or in otherwise 
uncontrolled situations, and that require direct control by the military command 
structure and military training for their proper execution" (US Department of the 
Army, AR 715-9: Contractors Accompanying the Force, 21). 
 
Contracts that outsource US military functions are governed by the Federal 
Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) and a defence department supplement (DFARS), 
but according to Avant (2000:2) these constitute only part of the market for US 
PMCs. Firms market themselves through the internet and also sell their services 
directly to foreign governments and other possible interested parties. The 
regulation additionally states that the conduct of any or all of these inherent 
governmental functions by contractors may violate the non-combat status afforded 
to them under the Geneva Conventions. 
 
The FM 100-21 defines that a contractor is a "person or business that provides 
products or services for monetary compensation" (US Department of the Army, FM 
100-21: Contractors on the Battlefield, 1-2). The products or services are limited to 
those functions of life support, construction, engineering, weapon systems support, 
and other technical services. The FM specifically states that contractors are not 
combatants but civilians accompanying the force and that they are generally 
"assigned duties at Echelons above Division (EAD)" (US Department of the Army, 
FM 100-21: Contractors on the Battlefield, 1- 10). The FM emphasizes that EAD 
should be indicative of the associated organizational structure as opposed to a 
location on a map. 
 
Goddard (2001) mentions that FM 100-21 delineates three categories of 
contractors. Firstly, theatre support contractors who provide contractual support at 
the operational level from within the local vendor base. Secondly, external support 
contractors who provide services that are required in theatre but are not available 
from the local vendor base. Thirdly, system contractors who provide specific 
support to material systems throughout their life cycle to include vehicles, aircraft, 
command and control infrastructure, and communications equipment and weapon 
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 systems such as the patriot missile defence system. Goddard (2001) believes that 
the US Army doctrine does not recognise PMCs by term but that the US Army 
doctrine does, however, distinguish contractors from such classification by the 
conduct and tangible effect of their operations. Contractors conduct logistic support 
and sustainment operations that are passive to the environment in which they are 
contracted to operate within. This framework of conduct is pivotal to the retention of 
a recognised status within the Geneva Conventions as legitimate, non-combat 
civilians on the battlefield (Goddard, 2001:18). 
 
The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ, 64 Stat. 109, 10 U.S.C. ch. 47) is the 
foundation of military law in the United States. The UCMJ was passed by Congress 
on 5 May 1950, signed into law by President Harry S. Truman, and became 
effective on 31 May 1951. The word "Uniform" in the Code's title refers to the 
congressional intent to make military justice uniform or consistent among the 
armed services. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_Code_of_Military_Justice / 
Author unknown, last revision 02:42, 18 June 2007 ) 
 
The UMCJ only covers transgressions committed by members of the US military, 
and excludes any civilians that accompany the force overseas. According to Singer 
(2004b:537) the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 intended to fill the 
void by applying the code to civilians serving in US military operations outside the 
United States. This Act, however, also has its limitations and it is only applicable to 
civilian contractors who only work directly for the US Department of Defence on 
military facilities and not for contractors who work for another US agency, nor for 
US nationals who work overseas for a foreign government or organisation (Singer, 
2004b:537). If an American PMC employee who works overseas for a foreign 
government or organisation is found guilty of committing a crime or offence under 
any other conditions not mentioned above, only the host state may prosecute 
him/her if there is a competent legal system to deal with the offence. Immediately 
loopholes occur in that the host may not be able to prosecute owing to a 
incompetent judicial system, unwillingness owing to a relationship with the host 
state government, or the PMC could be opposing the government and is therefore 
not under their scrutiny. 
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 The US Arms Export Control Act of 1968 regulates both arms brokering and the 
export of military services. These services were included in the Act by amendment 
in the 1980s following the discovery by the State Department that a number of 
private companies were giving military training to individuals from countries with 
which the US did not have good relations. This Act now constitutes the primary law 
in the US that establishes procedures for the sale of military equipment and related 
services (Straw, 2002). 
 
The Act stipulates the purposes for which weapons and services may be 
transferred; these range from self-defence to internal security. Defence services 
are defined as including the provision of and assistance in the design, manufacture 
and use of defence equipment, any provision of technical data on that equipment, 
any provision of military advice and any training of foreign units and forces, both 
regular and irregular. Training includes training delivered by correspondence 
courses and media of all kinds, and through exercises. 
 
US companies that offer military advice to foreign nationals (in the US and 
overseas) are required to register with and obtain a licence from the State 
Department under the International Transfer of Arms Regulations (ITAR) which 
implement the Arms Export Control Act (Straw, 2002). 
 
The US Government maintains the right to take action to ensure that licensing 
provisions are being met. In addition to this licensing procedure, congressional 
notification is required before the US Government approves exports of defence 
services worth in excess of $50 M. The US Federal Criminal Statute prohibits US 
citizens from enlisting or from recruiting others from within the US to serve a 
foreign government or party to a conflict with a foreign government with which the 
US is at peace (Straw, 2002). 
 
2.7  Assessment of the regulatory framework 
 
The regulation of PMCs has become an issue of governance and is of utmost 
importance. The focus needs to be on whether the international frameworks are 
toothless or not and if the SA and US laws can be applied extraterritorially. In the 
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 post-Cold War context, extraterritorial regulations are, for the most part, designed 
multilaterally in the interest of peace, or the interests of major powers (Le Billon, 
Hartwell & Sheman, 2002). Increasingly, multilateral instruments are designed and 
applied at a regional level rather than on a country-by-country basis. This category 
includes conditions on multilateral aid, UN instruments, including Security Council 
resolutions on arms embargoes and financial sanctions, expert panels, UN 
conventions against transnational organised crime and international terrorism, and 
the UN Global Compact’s efforts to engage private-sector actors in issues of peace 
and security (Le Billon et al, 2002). 
 
The threat of prosecution by the International Criminal Court, recently ratified by 
the required number of states, may hold promise as a deterrent against violent 
predation and as an incentive for warlords and other actors to uphold peace 
accords. Key initiatives and practices have also been developed by other 
multilateral organisations, most notably the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Union (EU), the Council of 
Europe, the Organisation of American States (OAS), and African regional and sub-
regional organisations (Le Billon et al, 2002). 
 
Currently international enforcement to regulate the PMC industry is uncoordinated. 
South Africa and the United States lead the way in legislation regarding PMCs. 
While several countries have domestic laws governing mercenary activity, few of 
these states have legislation relevant to private military companies. According to 
International Alert, there are four general categories of national legislation: “those 
passed to 1) control mercenary activities in response to the requirements of 
neutrality laws; 2) deal directly with mercenaries and mercenary activity; 3) regulate 
the provision of foreign military assistance as opposed to merely regulating 
mercenary activities and direct participation in conflicts; and 4) regulate military 
services within arms export control systems” (Beyani & Lilly, 2001:28). 
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 UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries 1989 
 
Beyani & Lilly (2001) feel that this convention is limited in its scope, and that it 
applies only to the country where mercenary activities take place, not to those 
countries violating its principles. The convention has not entered into force, but it 
does provide a minimum standard for national legislation. Critics argue that the 
treaty’s timing was poor, it came out when the private military trade started to boom 
(Singer, 2004b:531). 
 
The high demand for peacekeepers, especially during the 1990s, stretched the 
United Nations’ limited resources. The pressure mounted on the UN to intervene 
and dismantle dangerous and hostile situations. Unfortunately, in many cases like 
Rwanda, the organisation failed to meet these daunting challenges. UN military 
failures seemed to become commonplace. The UN has condemned the use of 
mercenaries since the 1960s. Ballesteros (1996) characterised mercenaries as 
politically disconnected from the societies into which they are introduced by 
governments (also a reason for their popularity) therefore making them instruments 
for oppression, used to violate human rights and to impede the exercise of the right 
to people’s self-determination. Ballesteros asserts that mercenary initiatives by 
private companies registered as security firms in a third country were a threat to 
national sovereignty. 
 
On the other hand the UN is still reluctant to take a definitive stand against PMCs. 
The UN does take a stand against mercenaries. This is illustrated in the UN 
General Assembly in 1973, adopted Resolution 3103. Sandoz (1999:204) states 
that the use of the phrase “these mercenaries” and not “the mercenaries” in the 
above-mentioned resolution, clearly shows that mercenary activity was identified 
with opposition to liberation struggles. Brayton (2002:304) mentions that the UN 
became very concerned about the role of mercenaries and therefore appointed 
Ballesteros, who reported a growing number of hired fighters. He also expressed 
his concern on how well equipped and organised these corporations were. 
Ballesteros also noted that security companies cannot be strictly considered as 
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 coming within the legal scope of mercenary status. (http://www.unhchr.ch / 
Ballesteros, E.) 
 
These statements point out the inability of the UN to diffuse all conflict situations 
especially where there are low intensity conflicts and a money shortage, the latter 
hampering the deploying of more peacekeeping soldiers. According to Smith 
(2002:112) the UN agrees that PMCs do not meet the stated definition of a 
mercenary. To ban PMCs completely could not just cause them to go underground 
but could clash with the UN Charter’s Article 51, which allows for states to take 
unspecified measures to protect themselves against attack. Singer (2004b:544) 
agrees and mentions that without a clear justification, any attempt to ban a new 
option for states to do so might be in contravention of this clause. 
 
The OAU/AU conventions regarding PMCs and Mercenaries 
 
Beyani & Lilly (2001:25) state that the OAU convention is intended to complement 
the UN international convention, but is in fact superior to it in many respects, 
including: defining the elements of the crime of mercenarism rather than only 
prohibiting the recruitment, use, financing, and training of mercenaries; converting 
perambulatory principles of the international convention into substantive provisions; 
and defining the criminal responsibility of states and their representatives. The 
OAU convention is rarely enforced, however, many signatories continue to violate 
its principles. It does not apply to private military companies, nor include corporate 
criminal responsibility (Beyani & Lilly, 2001:25). Political and strategic reasons for 
the lack of legislation could be because countries want to achieve certain policies 
without being too active in certain “non–democratic” states or states that are 
renowned for human rights abuses. The latter mentioned countries might have 
access to valuable resources that could help countries operating covertly to 
achieve strategic, political and foreign policy goals. PMCs could therefore be a 
valuable ally to front governments operating with or in these “rogue” states. 
 
This definition is broader and less technical, but the major weakness with the 
adopted AU definition is the small number of signatories to ratify this international 
convention. The AU tries to define mercenaries but fails to define PMCs, although 
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 some PMCs could be included in the definition according to their services rendered 
and by actively taking part in hostilities. Despite being involved with mercenary 
activities, South Africa is in favour of the African Peer Review but has not ratified 
the AU convention regarding mercenaries. South Africa, however, has progressive 
domestic legislation that combats mercenary activity (Aning et al, 2004:2). 
 
Foreign Military Assistance Act of the Republic of South Africa of 1998 
 
This Act carries punitive measures and applies to both individuals and PMCs 
engaged in mercenarism, defined simply as “direct participation as a combatant in 
armed conflict for private gain” within South Africa and abroad. Foreign military 
assistance is not proscribed, but falls under the licensing and authorisation of a 
separate government body also responsible for approving arms exports. Despite its 
extraterritorial nature and inclusion of PMCs, the Act has been criticised as being 
more of symbolic value than being an actual deterrent. Few companies have 
registered and few contracts have been licensed (Le Billon et al, 2002:65). 
 
Aning (2000:32) also mentions that in situations where regime interest and security 
are considered more important than international ethics, enforcing the above 
international conventions or following the South African example would be difficult. 
He states that the South African parliament unwittingly incorporated 28 of the 36 
proposals presented by EO into the bill, therefore encouraging as the South African 
bill is; its impact is limited in the following two main ways: 
 
• the bill seeks to ban South African citizens from participating in such mercenary 
activities. The immediate effect of this would be minimal because about 70 % of 
EO operatives are decommissioned and underpaid soldiers from African and 
European countries; and 
• there is a need for change in the perception from African leaders and the larger 
international community regarding the employment of mercenary services. 
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 United States laws regarding PMCs and Mercenaries 
 
Smith (2002:113) mentions that the State Department’s Office of Defence Trade 
Controls monitors the firms for compliance with the law and current US policy. He 
also states that in the case of MPRI, some critics argue that although it follows this 
procedure, the existing control mechanism is inadequate and allows the President 
of the US to circumvent the intent of Congress. Article 1 section 8 of the US 
Constitution, grants Congress the power to declare war, grant marque and reprisal, 
and make rules concerning captures on land and water (Smith, 2002). Cilliers & 
Mason (1999:2,3) agree that the US has strict federal laws and state legislation 
that require the companies to obtain government sanction before any commitments 
are made regarding the provision of goods, services, and security to the client. 
 
This drawback could be overcome according to Smith (2002:113) by congressional 
legislation that reintroduces the granting of letters of marque and reprisal and that 
provides guidelines for the oversight of PMCs either by the arms export regimes in 
place at the State Department or by establishing new ones that could include direct 
congressional oversight. According to Shearer (1998b:20) the US position appears 
to regard mercenary activity as non-criminal under international law and that 
mercenaries should enjoy the same status and protection as other combatants. 
 
Avant (2000:2) also states that the International Transfer of Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) reveal problems. She summarises them as follows: 
 
a) it is not clear that outsourcing of military training saves the US government any 
money; 
b) privatising military training may weaken the US armed forces’ expertise and 
capacity for engagement; using private contractors may make implementing the 
engagement policy easier, but by avoiding public debate, such a practice 
undermines the democratic process; and 
c) there is not enough oversight and control of private firms that sell training 
directly to foreign countries. (Avant, 2000:2) 
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 Conachy (2004) mentions that the mercenaries in Iraq have complete immunity 
from Iraqi law under an edict issued by the US Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA). Beyani & Lilly (2001:32) believe that “the ITAR is probably the most 
developed and comprehensive regulation system [capturing] the activities of most 
private firms in the US supplying defence services abroad.” Under ITAR, there is a 
“presumption of denial” for the provision of military services if they would lead to a 
“lethal outcome.” Effectively, this means that PMCs should not be allowed to 
engage in or train others for direct combat. However, determinations of this nature 
are often ambiguous. 
 
The US supports the PMC industry since its activities are aligned with foreign 
policy activities. As the US is very progressive in its laws regarding the industry, it 
is highly unlikely to clamp down on PMC activities. Singer (2004b:548) proposes 
that the US Congress could establish a more consistent and transparent licensing 
process that specifies oversight of US-based and/or employed PMFs and sets strict 
and public reporting requirements. 
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CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY – EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES AS COMBAT TYPE 
PMC IN ANGOLA 
 
3.1  Angola’s domestic regulatory framework for mercenaries and PMCs 
 
During the research, the Angolan government’s position regarding PMCs and 
mercenaries could not be established. The only information found on the subject 
matter was that of GIMUN (a simulation of UN debates) by university students. 
According to GIMUN, the Angolan government supports the view that legislation on 
mercenaries must incorporate more of the progressive features of international 
conventions, and should seek to improve the definition of a mercenary, as it stands 
in article 1 of the 1989 UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries. 
(http://www.gimun.org/2006/documents/CHR_Angola_.pdf/Security Council 
Angola/Author unknown) 
 
The 1989 Additional Protocol Convention moved this legislation forward by making 
the use of mercenaries illegal. Article 2 makes it an offence to recruit, use, and 
finance or train mercenaries. Article 5 binds signatories not to do the above and 
Article 9 obligates them to punish violations. So far, only 19 countries have ratified 
the convention and a further nine have signed but not ratified. Moreover it should 
be noted that at least three of the signatories, namely the governments of Angola, 
Yugoslavia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have engaged or used 
mercenaries or PMCs since they signed the convention. Although Angola has 
signed the convention, it is one of the nine countries who have not yet ratified it. 
(http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries.0.pdf) (Article title Private Military 
Companies: Options for Regulation author: Jack Straw) (accessed 
3 September 2006) 
 
According to the Geneva International Model United Nations (GIMUN) proposal 
(http://www.gimun.org/2006/documents/CHR_Angola_.pdf/Security Council Angola/Author 
unknown), the Angolan government strongly believes that the definition of 
mercenarism should refer to participation in international conflicts as well as in 
internal conflicts. According to the GIMUN proposal, Angola believes that 
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 mercenary activities must be considered a crime in and of itself and must be 
internationally prosecutable, both because they violate human rights and because 
they affect the self-determination of people.  
 
It must also be kept in mind that mercenary activity is a complex crime in which 
criminal responsibility falls upon those who recruited, employed, trained and 
financed the mercenary or mercenaries, and upon those who planned and ordered 
this criminal activity. Due attention must be paid to the study and analysis of the 
various ways in which mercenaries are used and act and of those who employ 
them, while recognising that this is not merely a legal question of definition, but 
also a question of actions and situations that affect life, security and international 
peace. Also, there is a need to distinguish between the activities that are deemed 
crimes under international law (i.e. terrorism) and those that require criminalisation. 
(http://www.gimun.org/2006/documents/CHR_Angola_.pdf/Security Council Angola/Author 
unknown) 
 
Mercenaries are widely condemned. But it is the booming of Private Military 
Companies (PMCs) that is increasingly becoming a policy headache by 
sidestepping current legislation and regulation. The GIMUN proposal states that 
the government of Angola believes that the legal and institutional response to the 
phenomenon of Private Military and Security Services (PMSSs or PMCs as 
referred to in this study) as it has manifested today is inadequate and urgently 
needs addressing. A general framework for regulation that would incorporate a 
minimum universal set of standards from all the regional perspectives towards 
PMCs should be extrapolated in order to achieve greater transparency in the acts 
of modern PMCs. 
(http://www.gimun.org/2006/documents/CHR_Angola_.pdf/Security Council Angola/Author 
unknown) 
 
Angola supports the view that a combination of international, regional and national 
legislation is required which specifically targets PMSSs to prevent the involvement 
of PMSSs into mercenary activities on the continent. Although different regions of 
the world had and still have their own specific problems in regard to the security 
industry, the same private companies operate across the world. It might be useful, 
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 therefore, when regulating the private security industry, to have a framework that 
works uniformly across the board. At the same time, regional mechanisms and 
national legislation could go beyond those standards to produce more regionally 
targeted strategies. In particular, regional mechanisms should be explored further 
as ways of controlling and monitoring PMSSs. Also, national codes that criminalise 
the mercenary activities of PMCs must be revised and amended. 
(http://www.gimun.org/2006/documents/CHR_Angola_.pdf/Security Council Angola/Author 
unknown) 
 
According to the GIMUN report, the Angolan government believes that activities of 
PMCs fall in the “grey areas” of international law. At present only a few countries 
have included PMSSs in their national legislation and as a consequence PMSSs 
exist internationally without effective regulation. The government of Angola strongly 
believes that international regulation would supply the legal framework for these 
services and provide them with both legitimacy and well-defined laws to abide by. 
The issue of an appropriate definition and the impact of PMSSs in past and 
ongoing civil wars must be pointed out, as on the international level there are no 
laws or conventions dealing specifically with PMSSs. 
(http://www.gimun.org/2006/documents/CHR_Angola_.pdf/Security Council Angola/Author 
unknown) 
 
The AU’s (with Angola as a member state) attempt to define mercenaries is, 
however, not watertight, since it is too narrow according to mercenaries’ purpose. 
The definitions would not have included employees of Executive Outcomes in 
Sierra Leone or Angola, nor anyone else working for a recognised government 
where training or security consulting is provided. Mercenaries, therefore, freelance 
their labour and skills to a party in foreign conflicts for fees above those of native 
counterparts. Malaquias (2001:314) states that “typically, insurgencies are 
responses to chronic governmental ineptitude and corruption, or to other forms of 
bad governance. More proximate causes include government insensitivity and 
ineffectiveness in meeting popular demands. Insurgencies can be ignited either 
through repressive actions by the government or by calculated actions carried out 
by legal or illegal opposition groups.” The AU’s definition is according to Jackson 
(2002:40) unworkable and has largely been discredited since many of the 
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 signatories (Angola being one of them) have been precisely those who employed 
mercenaries. 
 
Aning (2000:32) supports Jackson’s view and is very sceptical of the 
implementation of constitutive principles and norms under the OAU/AU against 
mercenaries only controlled through the goodwill and decency of individual 
governments (Angola being one of them). Aning (2000) states that “even this slim 
hope is already being undermined for two major reasons: firstly, since 1990, most 
of the daring mercenary actions in Africa have occurred under the legitimate 
purview of sovereign governments like Angola and Sierra Leone; secondly, the far-
reaching tentacles of corporatised mercenary activities and their impact on the 
legislative processes, even in countries prepared to tackle this problem, are not 
fully realised.” 
 
According to the research apart from the GIMUN proposal extensively drawn upon 
above, there is no relevant legislation regarding mercenaries in Angola since the 
AU definition of mercenaries does not apply to Executive Outcomes (EO) in 
Angola. The Lusaka protocol refers to “the repatriation of all mercenaries”, but it is 
well documented that both the government and União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) have used foreign "security specialists" 
(usually a euphemism for mercenaries) during their conflict. These foreign security 
personnel have not just trained and assisted Angolan forces, they have often 
participated directly in combat. 
(http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Angola.htm / Author unknown.Volume 8 number 
1(A). February 1996.) 
 
The Lusaka Protocol signed in Angola in 1994, provided for a ceasefire, the 
integration of UNITA generals into the government's armed forces (which were to 
become non-partisan and civilian controlled), demobilisation (later amended to 
demilitarisation) under United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) 
supervision, the repatriation of all mercenaries, the incorporation of UNITA troops 
into the Angolan National Police under the Interior Ministry, and the prohibition of 
any other police or surveillance organisation. Despite signing the Lusaka Protocol, 
human rights abuses still took place, both parties, UNITA and Movimento Popular 
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 de Libertaçao de Angola (MPLA) being guilty in this regard. 
(http://111.hrw.org/reports/1996/Angola.htm#N_3_#N_3_ / Author 
unknown.Volume 8 number 1(A). February 1996.) 
 
At the time, EO was deeply involved in the Angolan conflict from 1992 through 
1995. Although the Lusaka Protocol was “ignored” and EO maintained some 400 to 
500 men in Angola, mostly under contract to the Angolan Armed Forces according 
to a Human Rights Watch report of 1996 (http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Angola.htm / 
Author unknown.Volume 8 number 1(A). February 1996.). Pressure from mostly 
the US and other countries mounted on to the Angolan government, the latter 
finally told EO to withdraw in January 1996. Persons associated with EO, in 
whatever corporate guise thereafter, were still engaged in the Angolan 
government’s efforts to resolve the conflict by military means in 1998, albeit that 
they provided services that could not fall foul of the definition of “mercenary” 
(Cleary, 1999:166). It has, however, been reported that some EO men were being 
redeployed into front companies and are still operative in Angola (Isenberg, 2000). 
 
3.2  EO’s background: a South African PMC in Africa 
 
The highly specialised battalions and regiments of the SADF became a bargaining 
chip for negotiations leading up to create the “new” South Africa. Many soldiers 
and specialised military personnel were left without jobs and an income 
(Breytenbach, 2002a:346). Accusing the South African government of betrayal and 
not keeping promises, a Conservative Party spokesperson handed the then 
President of South Africa, FW de Klerk, 30 silver coins (collected by anonymous 
officers) in Parliament. With this act, the party showed its dismay at the 
disbandment of especially Battalion 32, the latter being a well-representative 
battalion. Many of these former soldiers, awarded a meagre severance package, 
were plagued by poverty and desperation therefore mounted (Breytenbach, 
2002a:346). 
 
According to Pech (1999:84), Executive Outcomes was set up in 1989 to serve as 
an intelligence training unit for the SADF Special Forces. Eeben Barlow and Lafras 
Luittingh (former 32 Battalion recces with later alleged Civil Cooperation Bureau 
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 (CCB) connotations) identified a niche market and with an able and willing supply 
of manpower that was unwilling to fight under a “backstabbing” new regime, 
founded Executive Outcomes. Most of these recruits knew no other skills than 
soldiering and EO provided a solution. Desperation, poverty and disappointment 
made the soldiers turn to EO as the financial benefits were very enticing. Shearer 
(1998b:42) states that payment in US dollars meant that, in real terms, EO salaries 
were around four times greater than regular army wages paid in South African 
Rand. 
 
Executive Outcomes, a combat type PMC, was founded by Barlow and Luittingh as 
a “military advisory company … to work all over the world training armies and 
getting involved in conflict resolution, but more related to the battlefield, not in the 
political sense” (Hooper, 2002:7). "As a private corporate entity, EO is able to 
operate without the restrictions of any particular nation's flag leading our soldiers 
into battle," stated Barlow. "Organisations such as the UN and the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) can make use of EO without partiality in negating the speedy 
resolution of conflict in any given country utilising our services. Our employees 
have over five-thousand man (sic) years of military knowledge, combat and training 
experience" (Barlow, 1998). 
 
Barlow also stated that EO “is a professional military advisory group working only 
for recognised governments” and is equipped with Soviet MiG fighter jets, Puma 
and East Bloc helicopters, state-of-the-art artillery, tanks, and other armaments. 
Barlow (1998) also pointed out that EO boasts an array of no less than 500 military 
advisors and 3 000 highly trained multinational special forces soldiers. 
 
According to an EO proposal in 1992, EO offered the following: 
 
• support services for “... clandestine warfare operations”; 
• training of “... freedom fighters” (in other words, insurgency forces); 
• procurement of “... any” weapons and equipment; 
• the conducting of “... clandestine sabotage actions”; 
• conducting of “... specific harassment operations within enemy rear areas”; 
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 • conducting of “... political propaganda operations”; and 
• waging of “... total guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines.” 
(Pech, 1999:85) 
 
Although EO officially denied a direct operational function, some EO personnel 
admitted to taking part in combat operations in Angola (Ashworth & Sellers, 
1997:17). Nick van den Berg, a senior member of EO, said that there was no 
paradox in EO’s activities, EO was only concerned with profit and was not 
interested in ideological wars (Arnold, 1999:116). Venter mentions that the 
essential tasks of EO members in the endless African conflicts in which EO was 
involved is to instruct, to protect and to organise. “They also take part in operations. 
When they are fired upon they respond vigorously. They are prepared to launch 
preventative attacks if these help save lives” (Arnold, 1999:116). 
 
An EO member admitted on South African television in 1995 that his organisation 
did not just train soldiers but engaged in aggressive military operations: "A team 
went ahead to clean up Cafunfo. We followed later and, on the way to Cafunfo, we 
killed about 300 enemy soldiers. Executive Outcomes was engaged in attacks all 
the time. It did give some training as well, but the successes of the MPLA could be 
directly attributed to Executive Outcomes' involvement" (SABC, 1995: 18:00 GMT). 
 
Apart from EO there were a few other PMCs or Private Security Companies 
operating in Angola. Cleary (1999:147,148) mentions at least four other PMCs and 
emphasises that EO differs from them in the sense that EO was in fact a Private 
Military Company capable of delivering private, specialised, military forces, 
therefore providing services that no civilian security company was equipped or 
licensed to provide. 
 
EO provided training to the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) until September 1993 
(Pech & Beresford, 1997a:24). According to Cleary (1999:156), EO was on and off 
involved in Angola for two periods of twelve months until September 1995 and for 
three more months until January 1996. During this time EO’s involvement 
multiplied new weapons purchases and brought about more dynamic leadership 
abilities within the FAA, turning the tables in the civil war (Cleary, 1999:156). 
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 According to Hooper (2002:65), EO never had its own armoury in Angola and relied 
on the host government to provide all the weapons. The recapture of the diamond 
fields in Lunda Norte in June 1994 was regarded by many as a turning point in the 
war. One major effect it had was reducing UNITA's capacity to pay for its 
operations. (Sunday Tribune: 31/07/1994). 
 
Barlow stated that “we are not going to help anyone that is not a legitimate 
government or that poses a threat to South Africa, or that is involved in activities 
really frowned upon by the outside world. We have had a major impact on Africa. 
We have brought peace to two countries almost totally destroyed by civil wars”. 
Claims such as these are very bold yet very necessary to provide the PMC market 
with the respectability and credibility it lacked in some cases. EO also claimed that 
its intervention in Angola forced Savimbi to the negotiating table (Venter, 1995:76 
and Luittingh, 1995). Howe (1996) also backed this statement by arguing that EO’s 
intervention successfully contributed to conflict resolution. 
 
3.3  Who mandated EO in Angola? 
 
Two former British special service officers with oil interests in Africa hired Barlow 
and a colleague to recruit a band of mercenaries for two month’s work in north-
western Angola in January 1993. The operation sounded simple – capture and 
defend valuable oil tanks at Kefekwena and then do the same for the oil town of 
Soyo which had been overrun by the troops of Jonas Savimbi’s União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (Pech, 1999:85). 
 
According to Bunker & Marin (1999), Executive Outcomes claimed that its sole 
purpose was to bring stability to the (Angolan) region by supporting legitimate 
governments in their defence against armed rebels. A number of analysts have 
noted its close connections with the Branch-Heritage group, a group of British 
companies with interests in energy and mining. Tony Buckingham, a senior director 
in a number of Branch-Heritage companies, is said to have introduced Eeben 
Barlow to Sonangol who employed EO in its first operations in Angola. Part of the 
payment for these services might have been guaranteed by Ranger Oil West Africa 
Ltd which shares oil blocks with Heritage Oil and Gas (a member of the Branch-
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 Heritage group). EO's parent company was most likely the South African-based 
Strategic Resource Corporation (SRC). EO exists in SRC's corporate universe as 
just one satellite in a web of thirty-two companies involved in a plethora of mining, 
air charter, and "security" concerns. These satellite companies are registered 
anywhere from Cape Town to the Bahamas to the Isle of Man (LoBaido, 1998). 
 
EO was contracted in January 1993 to capture and secure oilfields in Soyo and oil 
tanks in Kefekwena. This needed to be done to secure the interests of various oil 
companies who already had immense amounts of shares invested in the Soyo 
area. A full-scale war erupted between EO and Savimbi’s UNITA. The latter was 
heavily deployed in the Soyo area. EO’s involvement in Angola caused quite a stir. 
The media dubbed EO soldiers mercenaries, therefore regarding all their activities 
as illegal according to international law. Loopholes in the international law, such as 
the coining of a suitable definition for PMCs and the unwillingness from 
governments to comply with the international law opened the door for EO to secure 
lucrative “private security” deals. EO secured Soyo and therefore the employment 
of the private military entity was a successful strategic move on behalf of MPLA 
(Citizen; 24/03/1993). 
 
It is documented in Cilliers & Mason (1999:149,150) that EO found itself on both 
sides of the war early in 1993. EO withdrew and soon the Soyo area was under 
UNITA control. (Pech & Beresford, 1997a:24). The EO was obviously successful to 
fend off UNITA and to prevent UNITA from seizing Soyo. Owing to the success that 
EO achieved in Soyo another contract was given to them by the MPLA in 
August 1993 (Die Burger: 05/10/1993). 
 
EO had a contract with the government of Angola to provide protection and offer 
training in return for a share in the profits of the country's natural resources (Arnold, 
1999:117). The contract, reportedly worth $40 million, included a supply of arms as 
well as training. The government mortgaged between five and seven years of oil 
production to purchase these weapons. The need to guarantee payment from the 
governments of the thirty-one countries with which it conducted business, of which 
several were on the verge of bankruptcy, led EO to set up a company called 
Branch Energy. (Sawyer, 1998) 
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This company was intended to run the oil installations, and the gold, copper or 
diamond mines of cash-strapped countries like Angola and Sierra Leone. EO was 
given profit-sharing rights in lieu of hard currency. It is perhaps worth noting that 
the Diamond Works office in England is located at 535 Kings Road in downtown 
London, which just happens to be the address of ... Executive Outcomes! 
Executive Outcomes' famous contracts in Angola and Sierra Leone were 
coordinated by SAS veteran Tony Buckingham and EO's Eeben Barlow. 
(Sawyer, 1998) 
 
Buckingham had been set up with a pocket oil company, Heritage Oil and Gas in 
Oman, a traditional British Intelligence/SAS staging point. Heritage Oil and Coastal 
Oil, part of Buckingham’s business web, are reported to have provided loans for 
the government to purchase weapons whilst EO was in Angola. With the 
assistance and, on some occasions, direct participation of Executive Outcomes, 
the Angolan Government forces had a series of victories during 1994. 
(Sawyer, 1998) 
 
When the external security force is a component of a multinational corporation, the 
corporation potentially gains powerful leverage over a government and its affairs. In 
proffering security to collapsing, mineral-rich states such as Sierra Leone and 
Angola, multinational corporations accentuate the international exploitation and 
marginalisation of the states in question (Brayton, 2002). Some argue that 
corporate mercenary forces who support the search for strategic minerals 
represent neo-colonialism operating under the banner of liberal market policies 
(Francis, 1999:319). 
 
Although mineral exploitation is not the motive behind all private military activity, it 
clearly has been the driving factor in Sierra Leone and Angola. The motivating 
force in every case has therefore been commercial advantage, new business and 
fresh profit opportunities. 
 
According to Moore (1997) in both Angola and Sierra Leone, diamonds and 
De Beers were the kingpin of the game. He states that EO's armaments and 
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 officers were the core, with the addition of some local soldiers, which moved rebel 
groups out of diamond areas. De Beers in London drives the 4 000 employee 
strong Central Selling Organisation (CSO) which maintains the global monopoly 
structure of the diamond business and De Beers also runs one of the most 
sophisticated intelligence organisations in the world, using the full gamut of tools of 
the trade, such as dummy front companies, covert spying capabilities and private 
intelligence firms (Moore, 1997). 
 
Executive Outcomes’ contracts, nominally with the respective governments and, in 
part underwritten by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank 
arrangements in the finances of the target countries, were paid off with diamond 
concessions to a Buckingham front company, Branch Energy. Although not 
formally De Beers, Branch operates within the contractual domain of the CSO, like 
many other so-called independent diamond operations. 
 
Executive Outcomes' annual cost in Angola was a fraction of that of the UN's 
operation. In 1996/97 alone, UNAVEM III cost $135 million (Brayton, 2002). This 
impressive figure adds weight to those arguments that favour the regulated use of 
PMCs to provide stability and prevent conflict as in Rwanda and Bosnia, since 
PMCs are mobilised more easily and for less money. Howe (in Aning, 2000:32) 
agrees and states that by employing PMCs, influence is obtained at less political 
and economic costs. This could be true in a sense but to think that the buck 
stopped when EO withdrew is just premature thinking. By being affiliated to 
Strategic Resources Corporation (SRC), EO’s involvement in Angola and other 
countries opened the door to other SRC affiliates to sit at the negotiation tables 
where others merely had to wait outside. SRC contains a diverse web of 
companies whose activities include anything from demining, telecommunications, 
media and engineering and more (Pech, 1999:87). 
 
The contracts are still coming in for Branch Energy. Its concessions in Angola were 
renewed in 1997, with Teleservices (belonging to EO) awarded the security 
contract (Mail and Guardian:B1; 09/05/1997). The SRC infiltrated Angolese society, 
and EO paved the way towards the negotiation tables. The khakis, webbing and rat 
packs were donned and traded for suits and business dinners. The SRC was in the 
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 ideal position to negotiate for contracts in helping to reconstruct and to aid Angola 
in the development phase (Saturday Star: 21/10/1995). It has, however, been 
reported that some EO personnel are being redeployed from Executive Outcomes 
into front companies such as Saracen International (SI), Shibata Security (SS) and 
Stuart Mills International (SMI). These companies are involved in mine clearance 
(SI & SS) in the Soyo area (SI), and the renovation of a military hospital (SMI). 
Other companies reportedly linked to Executive Outcomes include Branch Energy 
operating in Cabinda (The Star: 24/10/1995). It can therefore be said that thanks to 
EO involvement, profit is still being made. 
 
3.4  EO’s withdrawal from Angola 
 
In November 1994 UNITA signed a peace agreement in Lusaka. This agreement 
included a provision for the withdrawal of foreign forces (Lusaka Protocol Annex 3, 
Agenda Item II.1, Military Issues (I) II-6). Under the Lusaka Protocol, "repatriation 
of all mercenaries in Angola" was demanded. According to the Human Rights 
Watch (1996:30-34) this became a contentious subject and the presence of EO 
personnel in Angola prompted UNITA to submit to the chairman of the Joint 
Commission a document entitled "Repatriation of all Mercenaries in Angola" in 
which it alleged that the Angolan government had recruited and was using 
mercenaries. 
 
The government of Angola responded by issuing a statement in November 1995 
which asserted that the definition of mercenary, as in the International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries adopted at 
the 45th session of the UN General Assembly in 1989, did not apply to EO 
personnel. They were called "foreign military and industrial security specialists" in 
the Angolan Armed Forces and industrial security firms, hired on a co-operation 
basis. The government argued that the co-operation agreements and contracts 
signed with the Ministry of Defence were legal as they were in accordance with 
Article 15 of Presidential Decree No. 2/93 on military policy (Human Rights Watch, 
1996:30-34). 
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 Executive Outcomes remained in Angola until December 1995 when it was 
withdrawn, reportedly on US insistence. General de Matos and Phillip Sibanda, the 
commander of UNAVEM forces, were present to monitor the repatriation of the last 
of the EO contingent. According to the Angolan government, 446 EO personnel 
were repatriated to South Africa (Hooper, 2002:228).  
 
When the peace accords were being signed in Angola, US President Clinton 
threatened to cut off aid if a contract the Angolan state had given to Executive 
Outcomes was not handed over to an American firm. EO withdrew due to the 
Angolan government that succumbed under US pressure. There are speculations 
that the US wanted to create an opportunity for a US PMC (MPRI) to fill the gap left 
by EO’s departure. The filling of the void by a US PMC is a very strategic move to 
look after the US national interest, but MPRI’s alleged involvement in Angola 
cannot be confirmed. The only evidence of such a possible contract is that the US 
state department has already approved a license for the contract, and numerous 
visits and negotiations took place between the two countries regarding the matter. 
(http://burn.ucsd.edu/archives/ats-l/1997.Jun/0040.html /Author unknown) 
 
3.5  Assessment 
 
Although the numbers involved were small – Executive Outcomes never had more 
than 500 men in Angola, compared with Angolan and Cuban armed forces of more 
than 100 000 men – they are generally regarded as having played a critical part in 
securing victory for the government forces and the ceasefire and the Lusaka Peace 
Agreement. The definitions and parameters of the Regulation of Foreign Military 
Assistance Act (1998) effectively encompassed the vast majority if not all of the 
operating conditions in which Executive Outcomes had successfully negotiated 
international contracts over the previous nine years. 
 
The Foreign Military Assistance Act forced EO and other PMCs to seek 
government authorisation for each contract. By then EO was out of Angola. The 
said Regulation Act also effectively made the South African government partly 
responsible for the actions of Executive Outcomes and any other South African 
based PMCs, as it legitimised their standing and conduct of international 
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 operations. In 1998, EO’s former CEO, Van den Bergh, pointed out that despite the 
new legislation, EO would still be able to operate in foreign countries. “The crux of 
the new bill [is] to regulate foreign military assistance to parties involved in armed 
conflict. So, as far as I’m concerned, if I’m not going to support any party involved 
in armed conflict then I don’t need to apply for permission or authorisation … If a 
country like the United States wants to contract me to provide a specific service for 
them, why would I need to ask the government’s permission? Because that is not 
regulated by this bill” (Pech, 1999:96, 97). 
 
For undisclosed reasons, the Executive Outcomes Board of Directors decided to 
terminate all operations, (in 1999, after EO served in Sierra Leone for some time) 
and wind down the company rather than risk prosecution by not complying with 
legislation. (www.globalsecurity.org /Author unknown) 
 
However, there are very strong indications that the Executive Outcomes' structure 
merely transferred its operations to a series of aligned companies that included 
Sandline International (which took over from EO in Sierra Leone in 1999) which 
was unfettered by such national legislation. This example highlights the fragility of 
regulation at national level, in that any legislation that is perceived by a PMC as too 
constraining, may simply force that PMC to relocate its operations to another nation 
that has less restricting legislation, if any at all. This aspect is a further indication 
that some PMCs are merely subcomponents of far larger and extensive 
transnational companies within the global security, mining, and resource industries. 
 
Brayton (2002) argues that although Executive Outcomes and similar firms provide 
military services, and not the full range of peacekeeping provided by the UN and 
national forces, there is no doubt that private firms mobilise more quickly and are 
less sensitive to casualties. Various claims are made by journalists, commentators 
and EO staff that they did bring Savimbi to the negotiation table, as mentioned 
earlier. It is also reported that EO’s presence was not negotiable, because General 
de Matos thought that EO was an integral part of his defence force and likely to 
remain so for a long time (Hooper, 2002:226). 
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 The UN frowns on the use of mercenaries. In his 1993/4 report, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries concluded that for Angola, "with regard to 
the aggravation of this armed conflict, the presence of foreign mercenaries who 
have participated in training operations and in combat has been a key factor in the 
duration and nature of the conflict" (Ballesteros, 1994). The UN might not regard 
EO very highly but EO did assist the UN in the provision of information and reports, 
because UN information and reports were “utterly valueless” (Hooper, 2002:225). 
The UN did not exactly pass the test to establish sustainable peace in Angola. Six 
months after EO’s withdrawal, UNITA launched a major attack in the Uige province 
(Hooper, 2002:227). UNITA's behaviour showed that the Lusaka Protocol was not 
adhered to and that the UN was torn between peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and 
conflict-resolution duties, and that maybe EO did fill a void. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY – MPRI AS A NON-COMBAT TYPE PMC IN 
EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
 
4.1  Equatorial Guinea’s domestic regulatory framework for mercenaries and 
PMCs 
 
Given the lack of relevant international legislation, greater emphasis falls on 
national legislation. The American PMC MPRI served in Equatorial Guinea. 
Domestic laws typically fall short. According to this research no applicable national 
laws in Equatorial Guinea could be found. The Neutrality Act of the US merely 
prohibits the recruitment of mercenaries within the US; being a mercenary is not in 
itself a criminal activity. Even the restriction against recruitment is rarely enforced. 
The US laws cannot necessarily apply to the contractors since many of them are 
not US citizens according to Singer (2003). 
 
Isenberg (1999) states that the US State Department amended the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations by adding the provision that persons engaged in the 
business of brokering arms shall register after paying a fee. The effect is that firms 
such as Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) receive official 
approval to transfer arms overseas. Of course, MPRI does not do such things 
without first fully clearing it with the appropriate approval authorities, but the effect 
might make it easier for smaller PMCs to do so in the future. 
 
According to Musah & Fayemi (2000), the Convention on the Elimination of 
Mercenaries (OAU CEM) in Libreville, Gabon on 3 July 1977, which entered into 
force on 22 April 1985, is outdated in the current era of intrastate warfare, 
”legitimate” private military and security companies (more often than not contracted 
by governments or multinationals) and resource-driven conflict. These deficiencies 
are compounded by the fact that despite widespread ratification, few African 
countries have domesticated the OAU CEM into national legislation. Singer (2003) 
states that it is unclear which laws apply to the contractors. He mentions that they 
do not fall under international law on mercenaries, which is defined narrowly. 
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 The requirement that mercenaries take a direct part in hostilities would exclude 
those, such as US-based Military Professionals Resources Inc. (MPRI), acting as 
foreign military advisers and technicians (Shearer, 1998a). 
 
4.2  MPRI’s background: an American company in Africa 
 
The MPRI advertises itself as having "the world's greatest corporate military 
expertise". Military Professional Resources Incorporated is a legally registered 
private company under Delaware state law. The company's office headquarters are 
located in Alexandria, Virginia. The MPRI website specifically incorporates this 
message within its "Organisation and Management and Business Philosophy" 
sections, declaring that "included among its board members  and employees are 
over fifteen retired four-star generals, including former chiefs and  vice-chiefs of 
military services and regional commanders-in-chief" (http://www.mpri.com.current/ 
Author unknown). 
 
According to Alvarez (2000), the MPRI is widely known for its military leadership 
and training focus within the US ROTC programme. In addition to conducting 
leadership training with the Croat Army in 1996, MPRI has also conducted military 
training operations with the Bosnian Croat-Muslim Federation Army, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA), the Army of Rwanda and the Colombian Ministry of 
Defence with employees currently in Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Nigeria. MPRI was also involved with the implementation of the Clinton 
administration’s African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) in Senegal. The Clinton 
administration's ACRI represented a deliberate government initiative to train 
African soldiers for peace operations within the African continent. The ACRI has 
been described as enabling an African solution for an African problem. Peters 
(1999) feels that it represents a deliberate measure designed to avoid commitment 
of US armed forces to the enduring security problems within the African continent. 
 
According to Horton (2004) there are PMCs working with Equatorial Guinea’s 
government. It is one of the countries to have State Department-approved US 
private military companies train and reorganise its military. In fact, these private 
contractors successfully pressured the US government to lift a ban on American 
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 companies that provide assistance to Equatorial Guinea. The ban had been 
imposed because of Equatorial Guinea’s appalling human rights record. 
 
MPRI operates the intelligence and communications systems at the US Northern 
Command in Colorado, which is responsible for coordinating a response to any 
attack on the United States. As MPRI is licensed by the US State Department, it is 
contracting with foreign governments, training soldiers and reorganising militaries 
in Nigeria, Bulgaria, Taiwan, and Equatorial Guinea (Yeoman, 2003). 
 
In Africa, according to Wayne (2002), MPRI has conducted training programmes 
on security issues for about 120 African leaders and more than 5 500 African 
troops. MPRI seems to have quite an array of ventures and assistance 
programmes in Africa according to their official website. 
(http://www.mpri.com/site/int_africa.html /Author unknown) 
 
Such programmes include: 
 
• The Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) 
 
 The ACSS’ primary focus is to bring together senior African military and civilian 
leaders to study and share ideas on a full range of strategic topics. These 
efforts are intended to forge partnerships among African leaders to enhance 
their ability to deal with the challenges confronting their nations. ACSS also 
serves as an important asset for promoting close ties between the United 
States and many African countries. Among its assigned tasks, MPRI provides 
support, participates in strategic planning in support of the centre, assists in 
curriculum development, supports faculty recruitment, and provides support to 
the symposiums and other ACSS events. 
 
• African Contingency Operations and Assistance (ACOTA) programme 
 
 The ACOTA programme is a US State Department coordinated inter-agency 
programme that works with African states and other allies to develop and 
enhance peace-support operations and humanitarian assistance capabilities 
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 among selected African armies. The MPRI team of multilingual regional and 
functional experts provides various levels of training, often in coordination with 
US military forces. To date, the team has conducted training in Benin, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Malawi, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Senegal. The ACOTA 
programme directly addresses a principal US policy objective in Africa, namely 
to increase African capacities to fight terrorism and to prevent, mitigate and 
resolve crises, conflicts and regional instability. 
 
• Civil-military transition assistance in Nigeria 
 
 MPRI has provided cross-functional teams of experts to Nigeria to assist the 
Ministry of Defence, the National Assembly, and the armed forces in developing 
and implementing a jointly developed action plan for the national defence 
structure, with the goals of re-professionalising the armed forces, developing 
competence among civil leaders in defence, disengaging the military from civil 
government functions, and improving the standing of the armed forces among 
the people. In addition, MPRI provided leader development seminars for senior 
and mid-grade civilian and military leaders, budget transparency assistance to 
the government of Nigeria in accordance with international standards, and 
assistance to the Ministry of Defence and the National Assembly in working 
together on defence matters. MPRI hosted delegations of Nigerian Defence and 
legislative leaders for exchange visits with US counterparts. MPRI also 
established a cutting-edge Joint Simulations centre and assisted in the 
operation of the centre that is focused on peace support operations and security 
operations with the Nigerian government. 
 
• National Security Enhancement Plan (NSEP) for Equatorial Guinea 
 
 MPRI developed an integrated team of defence, security, and coast guard 
experts to provide a detailed set of recommendations to the government of 
Equatorial Guinea concerning its defence, littoral, and related environmental 
management requirements, and also a detailed implementation processes. The 
implementation date of the NSEP was early 2006. 
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 • South Africa 
 
 MPRI, working in close coordination with the Republic of South Africa’s 
Department of Defence and with the support of the US government, provided a 
range of training, education and policy analysis programmes to the RSA over a 
two-year period. Areas of concentration included strategic and contingency 
planning, leader development, instructor training, departmental management 
and processes, development of civilian defence personnel, and distance 
learning. (http://www.mpri.com/site/int_africa.html /Author unknown) 
 
4.3  Who mandated MPRI in Equatorial Guinea? 
 
In 1998, MPRI sought the US government’s approval to enter Equatorial Guinea 
and shape a plan to train and equip a national coast guard force. The contract was 
initially rejected by two State Department desks, delaying it for two years over 
concerns of the Equatorial Guinea government's record of human rights abuses. “It 
was approved only after MPRI lobbied the department's Africa desk, arguing that if 
it was not allowed to do the job, someone else would” (Brown, 2000:3-5). That 
“someone else” might not have been a US registered PMC, but a competitor PMC 
registered elsewhere and therefore US interests would not be looked after. MPRI 
secured these interests by advising President Obiang of Equatorial Guinea on 
building a coast guard to protect the oil-rich waters being explored by Exxon Mobil 
off the coast (Wayne, 2002). 
 
Why the interest in Equatorial Guinea? According to Horton (2004) that question 
can be answered in one word – oil. Smoltczyk (2006) mentions that Equatorial 
Guinea now has the highest per capita income, adjusted for purchasing power, in 
Africa. No other economy in the world has experienced 30 % average annual 
growth in the last five years. The country has fewer inhabitants than the German 
city of Düsseldorf, but each year it collects several hundred million dollars in 
revenues from oil companies. “Unfortunately," writes the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) in its country report, "this wealth has not even led to a measurable 
improvement in living conditions” (Smoltczyk, 2006). 
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 The US is searching for an alternative to Middle East oil. Horton (2004) believes 
that the US has now switched attention to the Atlantic waters of the Gulf of Guinea 
states – Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, the Republic of 
Congo (which is not to be confused with its much bigger neighbour, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo), Angola and Sao Tome and Principe. The Americans hope that 
oil from the Gulf of Guinea will make them less dependent on the Persian Gulf 
(Smoltczyk, 2006). 
 
The US already imports 15 % of its annual oil requirements from the Gulf of Guinea 
and this figure is predicted to exceed 25 % by 2015. The African Oil Policy Initiative 
Group, a lobbying group comprising oil executives and Pentagon officials, reported 
to the US Congress that the Gulf of Guinea and its vast oil supplies made it a “vital 
interest in US national security calculations” (Astill, 2003). It suggested establishing 
a US military sub-command for the Gulf of Guinea and setting up bases on the 
islands of Sao Tome and Principe. “Unless the US did more to prop up the oil 
industry there”, commented one senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, 
“the oil industry ran the risk of imploding as a result of the region’s inherent 
instability” (Guardian Weekly, 10/7/03). 
 
According to Robert Murphy of the US State Department's Bureau of Intelligence 
(Smoltczyk, 2006), "Much of the oil in West Africa is offshore, which separates it 
from domestic political or social unrest." Therefore the oil can be shipped directly to 
the United States, without going through high risk areas. 
 
4.4  MPRI’s role (as non-combat type PMC) in Equatorial Guinea 
 
MPRI first applied for a license from the US State Department, as required by US 
legislation, to work in Equatorial Guinea in 1998. But the department's Bureau of 
African Affairs rejected the request because of Equatorial Guinea's history of 
human rights violations. MPRI appealed that decision to the assistant secretary of 
state for African affairs, then Susan Rice. "I pointed out to her that no one knows 
what's going on in the country, and the US ambassador has supported our 
application," Soyster, an MPRI spokesman, said (Dare, 2002). 
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 According to Dare (2002), MPRI cleared the Africa bureau's concerns, only to hit 
another roadblock at the department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
Labour. Again, MPRI lobbied, this time in the US Congress, and a contract to 
assess Equatorial Guinea's defence needs was approved. Between 2001 and 
2002, MPRI made several trips to Malabo to meet government officials and oil 
company executives. Bill Watson, vice president of Hess Triton in Equatorial 
Guinea, was one of those who met with MPRI, characterising it as a "courtesy" 
visit. Also participating in some of the meetings was Staples, the US ambassador 
to Cameroon, according to a military attaché who was present at the meetings 
(Dare, 2002). 
 
MPRI submitted a proposal to revamp the armed and police forces of Equatorial 
Guinea, but was granted a license by the State Department in May 2002 to train 
only the Coast Guard. US Senator Russell Feingold, a leading proponent of human 
rights in Africa, has been at the forefront of opposition to MPRI getting a contract 
for comprehensive military training in Equatorial Guinea for fear that US-trained 
forces will be used against government opponents. 
(http://www.mountainrunner.us/files/warbusiness.doc /Author unknown) 
 
Goddard (2001) concurs that MPRI has exploited the wide parameters of 
subparagraph 2(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 
1949 that enables foreign advisors and military technicians to be excluded from the 
definition of a mercenary. “Although the end state from some of the international 
contracts conducted by MPRI personnel may be the integral equipping and training 
of a foreign nation state's personnel for direct combat operations, the individual 
status of MPRI contracted personnel is not compromised in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol” (Goddard, 2001). According to the MPRI website, the company 
has the resources and expertise to (legally) conduct training programmes, force 
development actions, equip armies in transition, and to conduct doctrine and 
leadership training "short of combat operations" (http://www.mpri.com.current 
/Author unknown). 
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 4.5  Assessment 
 
Yeoman (2003) mentions that MPRI are staffed with retired military officers who 
are well connected at the Pentagon – putting them in a prime position to influence 
US government policy and obtain more business for their firms. They operate with 
little oversight, and use contractors that also enable the military to skirt troop limits 
imposed by US Congress and to carry out clandestine operations without 
committing US troops or attracting public attention. ”Private military corporations 
become a way to distance themselves and create what we used to call plausible 
deniability” says Daniel Nelson, a former professor of civil-military relations at the 
Defence Department's Marshall European Centre for Security Studies. ”It's 
disastrous for democracy.” 
 
The US government has an overt relationship with US PMCs of which MPRI is but 
one of many. The MPRI website specifically states that "each of MPRI's current 
international contracts is directly with a foreign government and that none are 
controlled by the US government. However, each has in place a license from the 
US Department of State." (MPRI Activities Brief, Homepage of MPRI. Available 
from http://www.mpri.com.current /Author unknown) 
 
Therefore MPRI's international contracts must operate with the consent of the US 
government. According to Brown (2000:3-5), it is exactly this linkage to government 
that has led some academic quarters to assert that PMCs have "quietly taken a 
central role in the exporting of security, strategy and training of foreign militaries –
it's a tool for foreign policy in a less public way." De la Garza (2001:4) notes that an 
MPRI spokesman, retired Army Lieutenant General Ed Soyster acknowledged this 
fact. With reference to the Clinton administration's "Plan Columbia", Soyster 
agreed that "they were using us to carry out American foreign policy. We certainly 
don't determine foreign policy, but we can be part of the US government executing 
its foreign policy." 
 
Another point of view is that PMCs’ development has enabled governments to 
commit to foreign crises while avoiding the publicly sensitive issue of potentially 
sustaining troop casualties on missions other than fighting wars. According to 
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 Adams (1999:103-116), "for the risk-averse, like the US military, employing such 
private contractors can help to overcome the political reluctance to become 
involved in situations where risks are high and there is little domestic constituency 
for involvement of US troops." 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.1  Comparing EO with MPRI 
 
EO is seen as a combat type PMC and MPRI as a non-combat type PMC but the 
imperceptible line between "military advisors" and combatants is often crossed. 
MPRI personnel are alleged to have helped in planning the Croat occupation of 
Krajina and ethnic cleansing of the Serbs in 1995 (Silverstein, 2000). EO’s 
involvement in combat, however, is well documented (in Angola and Sierra Leone). 
The distinction between combat and non-combat operations is often artificial. The 
people who fly soldiers and equipment to the battlefield are as much a part of the 
military operation as those who do the shooting. At one remove the same applies 
to those who help with maintenance, training, intelligence, planning and 
organisation – each of these can make a vital contribution to war fighting capability. 
Other tasks such as demining or guarding installations may be more or less distant 
from active military operations according to the broader strategic picture (Straw, 
2002). 
 
5.1.1  Similarities between combat type and Non-combat type PMCs 
 
EO as a combat type (now defunct) and MPRI as a non-combat type claimed to be 
PMCs and not mercenaries. Both these companies rendered their services in 
Africa and both the abovementioned companies have also provided their clients 
with training, intelligence gathering, support, surveillance, countersurveillance, 
interrogation and counterinterrogation skills. According to Pech (1999:100), they 
even provided training of dog and horse units. The latter became very popular 
especially with the rise of organised criminal activity in South Africa that is linked to 
global syndicates. EO and MPRI tendered for a dog unit contract in Saudi Arabia in 
1997 (Pech, 1999:100). Both companies’ personnel consist of former military 
personnel with many years of active duty experience. 
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 5.1.2  Differences between EO and MPRI 
 
According to Cullen (2000:38), the South African government largely tolerated the 
emergence of Executive Outcomes as an almost wholesale privatisation of certain 
apartheid-era elite battalions. This tolerance was demonstrated mainly because EO 
offered a convenient way to employ potentially dangerous elements within the state 
during the fragile transitional period to democracy, rather than out of a calculated 
foreign policy. Cullen (2000:38) states that the kind of trust implicit in the 
relationship of the United States with MPRI was lacking between EO and South 
Africa, and that helps to explain why EO decided to end operations a few months 
before the new South African legislation regulating PMC activity was to take effect. 
Without strong PMC and home government links, one cannot assume any real 
degree of home state accountability of PMC activity by means of informal 
oversight. 
 
MPRI, according to Cilliers & Douglas (1999:113-114), considered direct 
participation in military combat similar to the arrangements made between the 
government of Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes, and the contract signed by 
the government of Papua New Guinea and Sandline. Cilliers & Douglas (1999:114) 
state that the official MPRI response regarding involvement in military combat 
operations is: “If you want Executive Outcomes you don’t want MPRI.” 
 
Cilliers & Douglas (1999:111) concur that MPRI is encouraged to undertake profit-
making military ventures that are aligned with the national security interests of the 
US, but does so overtly. EO, however, worked largely independent of South African 
government regulation (Isenberg, 2000). The difference between the man who 
pulls the trigger and the operational staff member who decides where to attack, 
when and with what, or the trainer who moulds units into effective operational units, 
remains debatable (Cilliers & Douglas, 1999:114). 
 
5.2  Is regulation sufficient? 
 
After examining all the relevant laws regarding the topic, this research paper 
concludes that states’ ability to control PMCs on international as well as national 
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 level is at best limited or almost impossible. The reason is mainly owing to the 
circumstances and conditions under which PMCs operate. Weak states (Reno, 
2000) are their employers, hence the lack of proper judicial systems and monitoring 
which makes monitoring, transparency and accountability almost impossible. 
 
Many PMCs are anxious to see the development of rational regulatory frameworks 
and are willing to submit to the monitoring of their activities. The development of 
benchmarks for good (and ethical) business practice opens the doors for the 
legitimisation of firms and thus more contract opportunities, but also for the civil 
oversight of the industry (McIntyre, 2004:103). Prospects could look less gloomy if 
PMCs are regulated by countries through their own domestic legislation. In quite a 
few instances laws need to be drafted on domestic levels to deal with the PMC 
phenomenon successfully. The most active efforts in controlling PMCs are 
occurring on a national basis (Isenberg, 2000). National legislation, however, is not 
a long-term solution (The Economist, 16-22/01/1999). 
 
Insufficient measures by countries and the UN, as an international organisation, to 
actively combat mercenarism and regulate PMCs, show that mercenarism and 
PMCs are not a very high priority within the UN. Brooks & Solomon (2000) state 
that the UN International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries 1989 has added even more confusion to the matter, and it 
is impossible to prove all the requirements stipulated in the treaty that must be met. 
The UN treaty also ignores certain requirements and therefore creates even more 
loopholes to exploit within the international law. The treaty does not deal with 
private military armies, only individuals and also not individuals who regard religion 
as the main motivator. 
 
According to Cullen (2000, 37), at a political level this can be explained by the fact 
that the international community simply does not want tough legislation on this 
issue, with both strong and weak states often preferring to keep this private military 
option open for future availability. This is illustrated by the fact that many of the 
signatories of the OAU/AU convention have, since signing, actually hired 
mercenaries themselves (Cullen, 2000:37). 
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 The recent “rent-a-coup” episode in Africa that involved the British Logo Logistics 
firm, illustrates the problem of teasing out exactly what is the right or moral thing to 
do in the absence of international or national guidance or rules regarding PMCs 
(Singer, 2004a:9). The firm has been accused of fronting for outside interests 
(wealthy businessmen and an exiled leader) in the profit-motivated toppling of 
Equatorial Guinea’s government (Padera, 2004). Equatorial Guinea’s president 
took power by killing his uncle, and was a wholly ruthless human rights abuser of 
the worst sort. This might have been “legitimate” under archaic international 
standards (Singer, 2004a:9). 
 
5.2.1  What are the weaknesses of the regulation of PMCs? 
 
McIntyre (2004:102) warns against strict regulations against PMCs, given the 
growth of the private military sector and its current embeddedness in Africa. She 
believes that this could have the adverse results of reducing state transparency 
regarding the defence sector and driving private actors underground (McIntyre, 
2004:102). The risk of the emergence of mercenary groups in this scenario would 
increase. O’Brien (2000) agrees that “in South Africa, the larger players were 
known and contributed to a degree of self-regulation of the industry; the heavy-
handed approach of the South African government towards confronting these 
companies now means that the larger players may now leave the country to base 
themselves elsewhere or break-off into much more covert companies which the 
government will not be able to keep track of with anywhere near the same ease 
which they had the larger companies previously.” This, however, is not a PMC 
weakness but a weakness of the tough regulations of PMCs, because PMCs will 
simply close and open up shop elsewhere that is less regulated or where no 
regulations might exist.  
 
“Private military firms and their employees are integral, inherent parts of military 
operation. But, at the end of the day, they are not part of military. This means that 
the old legal codes, which seek to create a sharp delineation between civilians and 
soldiers, are not readily useful” (Singer, 2004a:9-10). The monitoring of PMC 
activities are very difficult because of the environments they operate in. Singer 
(2004b:541) believes that the very form of the PMF gives it the ability to defeat 
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 almost any attempts at strict legal controls at this level, and that problems arising 
from the extraterritorial nature of their operations and the overall weakness of state 
ordinances also mitigate any efforts at establishing and regulating the legal status 
of firms at domestic level.  
 
The lack of political will to create effective legislation regarding PMCs and their 
activities is also a big concern. To give the domestic legislation more teeth, Singer 
(2004b:548) proposes that the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (of the US) be 
expanded to include the activities of any American PMFs and/or American PMF 
employees working abroad, regardless of who their clients are. Enforcement of this 
expansion is, however, problematic, but could be better suited to deal with the 
industry’s regulatory challenges. 
 
One major weakness of the regulation of PMCs is that international law does not 
define the status of contractors (they do not fit the international mercenary 
definition) and, other than the untested International Criminal Court, it lacks the 
actual means to enforce itself without the state (Singer, 2004a:12-13). “There is far 
less accountability to the American public and to international law than if real troops 
were performing the tasks. Crewdson (2003:C3) mentions that in at least two past 
DynCorp (a US PMC) operations, employees were accused of “engaging in 
perverse, illegal and inhumane behaviour, purchasing of illegal weapons, women 
and forging passports along with committing other immoral acts”. One of the 
employees taped himself while raping two young women, and even with the 
irrefutable evidence against these employees none of them was criminally 
prosecuted, mainly because of the absence of law enforcement, according to 
Singer (2004b:525). Had these men been soldiers, they would have faced court-
martial proceedings. As private workers, they were simply put on the next plane 
back to America” (Yeoman, 2004). 
 
The notorious Bob Denard received a five-year suspended sentence from a French 
court in 1993. Denard took part in a failed coup in Benin, in which seven people 
died (Burns, 1995). This example shows the ineffectiveness of the laws regarding 
PMCs and the ineffective enforcement of the laws. None of these cases or similar 
crimes regarding mercenaries or PMCs and/or their employees appeared in the 
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 International Criminal Court in The Hague. These exploited gaps in the legal 
system regarding PMCs and their regulation need to be filled to avoid future 
atrocities. 
 
Cilliers & Cornwell (1999:238) believe that conventions such as the International 
Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries  
of 1989 will remain toothless and useless, unless the international community can 
come up with clear legal responses to what constitutes illegal private military 
involvement, as opposed to mercenary activity. Currently Africa is providing a 
lucrative marketplace for PMC activities. The continent’s underdeveloped character 
can easily be exploited owing to the absence of monitoring border movements and 
the lack of proper negotiation instruments. According to Cilliers & Cornwell 
(1999:240) extradition agreements are absent in many cases and they believe that 
the principle followed in cases of international crimes of extradition or prosecution 
should be applied to deal with atrocities committed by private security and military 
companies. 
 
Normally, an individual's crimes fall under the local nation's laws. The South 
African government confirmed this through saying that its nationals arrested in 
Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea regarding the “rent-a-coup” plot, will have to 
stand trial and serve any prison sentences in these countries. "We have no 
prisoner transfer agreement with any country," said foreign ministry spokesman 
Ronnie Mamoepa. "As with all South Africans arrested in foreign countries, they 
will have to face the laws of those countries should it turn out that they were 
mercenaries. We do however, offer consular services. But bringing them back 
would be out of the question" (Padera, 2004). According to Singer (2004a:13), 
PMCs typically operate in failed state zones; indeed, the absence of a local state is 
usually why they are there. These areas where PMCs usually operate, mostly do 
not have sufficient regulations regarding PMCs and therefore regulation is not 
adequate. Examples include: Angola, Sierra Leone and Equatorial Guinea. 
 
The OAU/AU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa (CEMA) 
definition of mercenaries presents according to Aning et al (2004:2) a number of 
grey areas relating to state engagement of the services of mercenaries such as 
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 PMCs that provide guarding of VIPs, sensitive installations and training of the 
military of a regime in need of their services, which do not fall under Article 1(b) of 
the CEMA (Aning et al, 2004:8,9). Zarate (1998:129) states that the drafters 
constructed the convention to allow African governments to continue to hire non-
nationals as long as they were employed to defend themselves from “dissident 
groups within their own borders,” whilst disallowing their use against any other AU 
supported rebel groups. 
 
The FMAA had no mechanism to effectively determine the existence of armed 
conflict, failed to define mercenaries or their activities and excluded “humanitarian 
assistance” from its regulations (Webb, 2006:6). These above-mentioned three 
areas were considered as major weaknesses, were and could be exploited by 
mercenaries and PMCs, therefore making prosecution a tough act to follow. Critics 
of the FMAA point out that it offers no distinction between legitimate private military 
activity and mercenarism. One result of this might be that potential recruits to the 
industry prefer to circumvent the requirement of seeking permission from the 
National Conventional Arms Control Committee rather than running the risk of 
becoming enmeshed in a process that appears to lack clarity, and for some, is felt 
to penalise a sector of the population, namely former South African Defence Force 
(SADF) soldiers demobilised during the post-Apartheid transformation, whose 
military backgrounds and skills are in demand elsewhere, if not in their home 
country (McIntyre, 2004:103). 
 
According to Smith (2005:24), South Africa passed its Foreign Military Assistance 
Act under which it tried to prosecute the Equatorial Guinea coup plotters and 
ended up with a plea bargain deal with Mark Thatcher. In Zimbabwe, owing to the 
lack of domestic legislation that deals with mercenarism, the 70 men were charged 
with the violation of Zimbabwe’s Public Order and Security Act, the Firearms Act 
and the Immigration Act (Aning et al, 2004:64). Other African countries also lacked 
the capacity in the past to prevent the recruitment and transit of men and weapons 
through their territory, and so failed to meet the commitments pledged to the 
APRM.  
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 The mercenaries that flowed from South Africa through Ghana into the Ivory Coast 
are a perfect example of such failures and flaws in the system (Aning et al , 
2004:65).Although the regional and state collaboration and co-operation regarding 
elimination of mercenary activities are important, the Equatorial Guinea saga once 
again showed that African countries are not geared to deal with this phenomenon 
of mercenarism sufficiently and that they lack the legal capacity to expose serious 
flaws in the legal frameworks.  
 
Smith (2005:24) believes that PMCs are currently in a legal no-man’s-land. He 
believes that they are “illegal internationally and have no rights or obligations, and 
they are outside the Geneva Conventions or the International Criminal Court 
(ICC).” Arnold (1999:126) states that “the mercenaries if properly controlled and 
regulated, answer a vital market need and one that is likely to grow in the future”. It 
is therefore up to states to be involved in the formative years of the puppy, to assist 
in the training and nurturing process, otherwise the puppy would grow up rogue 
and become an untrainable dog … wetting carpets and becoming a future 
embarrassment … if it is not already too late. 
 
South Africa is, however, once again taking a step towards better regulation by 
drafting the Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of 
certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill. This bill is not focused on for the 
purpose of this study, but its relevance is acknowledged. The government 
proposed that the existing Foreign Military Assistance Act of 1998 (FMAA) needs to 
be repealed and replaced with the new act (Webb, 2006:6). 
 
A shortfall of The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation 
of certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill is that although legislation could 
be used to authorise and refuse permission to do legitimate work abroad owing to 
political or ideological considerations, there are no clear guidelines (Le Roux, 
2006:5). According to Nathan as quoted by Le Roux (2006:5), it is “entirely unclear” 
why the drafters of the bill had seen fit to criminalise the rendering of humanitarian 
assistance without authorisation. Nathan feels that “it would not prevent any 
obvious mischief, and it is likely to cause considerable harm to humanitarian 
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 organisations, their staff and South Africa’s international reputation”. (Le Roux, 
2006:5) 
 
Critics feel that the bill is a “shotgun approach” to the problem, and warned against 
the economic implications as well as the criminalisation of locals and foreigners 
who work in conflict areas no matter how noble their cause (Webb, 2006:6). Brooks 
(2006:5) concurs that “many international efforts will be at risk … (some) will have 
to close their operations if they can’t rely on South Africans, also that there is a 
concern that the anti-mercenary bill was counterproductive and ran contrary to 
democratic ideals.” 
 
5.2.2  What is adequate about the regulation of PMCs? 
 
Legislation regarding PMCs is speckled with loopholes and grey areas. Legislators 
are therefore challenged to draft laws that will curb irregular and unlawful practices 
in the PMC industry. Creating a platform for conversation between PMCs, 
governments and international organisations is of utmost importance. According to 
O’Brien (2000) “it is felt that the ‘anti-mercenary’ legislation passed in South Africa 
did not seek to ban EO’s activities but merely bring them under government 
control” and that it is also “laudable as a starting point” but still problematic. O’Brien 
(2000) believes that current UK guidelines on arms control and the EU Code of 
Conduct on the arms trade provide a good starting point for examining potential 
ways forward to regulate the PMC industry. 
 
Another comprehensive response to conflict in Africa is the Protocol relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council adopted in Durban by the AU in 
2002. Heads of state have committed themselves to four areas, namely early 
warning, using of force, combating of mercenarism, peacekeeping and preventing 
conflict (Aning et al, 2004:3). The latter also states that amongst other standards 
the range of legislative measures that have been put in place to translate the 1977 
Convention on Mercenarism should be incorporated into national law and that 
there should also be a level of inter-state and inter-agency collaboration to fight 
mercenarism. 
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 Various sub-structures of the SADC countries on politics, defence and security co-
operation institutionalise general arrangements of the sharing of intelligence 
regarding mercenaries, but generally on a bilateral basis. Aning et al (2004:10) 
state that African states’ levels of compliance to combat mercenarism are 
sometimes tenuous and that there is a desperate need to respond to mercenary 
activities. The recent arrest of mercenaries in Zimbabwe could lead the charge. It is 
crucial that states grant each other support regarding mercenary activities if they 
want to tackle the problem successfully. 
 
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) reviewed pledges by eight states to 
 
• prevent entry into or passage through their territory of any mercenary or any 
equipment destined for mercenary use, and 
• offer state capacity and willingness to take all the necessary legislative and 
other measures to ensure the immediate entry into force of this convention. 
(Aning et al, 2004:59) 
 
Indicators identified to operationalise these commitments included 
 
• the level of inter-state and inter-agency collaboration to fight mercenarism, and 
• the extent of legislative measures that have been put in place in the individual 
countries to translate the CEMA into national legislation. 
 
Aning et al (2004:59) mention that although the above-mentioned are necessary, 
the states that did accede to the APRM are in their words “exemplary ones, their 
legislative and judicial capacities are at best weak.” 
 
Although the legislative and judicial capacities are under severe criticism, an 
interview with an official of the South African High Commission in January 2004 
brought to light that states have informal networks of collaboration and coordination 
in the area of information-sharing among the operators and heads of intelligence 
networks (Aning et al, 2004:64). The effectiveness of information-sharing between 
African states and the commitment to crush mercenary activities in Africa were 
clearly demonstrated in 2004 when an alleged coup plot in Equatorial Guinea was 
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 uncovered. Arrests were made in Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe and South Africa. 
Officials in Equatorial Guinea and Zimbabwe later stated that they had been 
monitoring the plot in collaboration with South African investigators. 
 
The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and Prohibition and Regulation of certain 
Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill of 2006, according to Webb (2006:6), aims 
to define job descriptions and theatres of conflict and to enforce punitive measures 
that could see offenders sentenced to life in prison. The Bill will permit “military 
assistance” in liberation struggles, but will demonise South African involvement  in 
conflicts not sanctioned by the state (Webb, 2006:6). The new bill might just prove 
to be adequate or maybe not, but only time will tell. 
 
5.2.3  What needs to be done about the regulation of PMCs? 
 
Breytenbach (2002b:8) feels that the UN must step up to the plate and lead the 
way in formulating guidelines for the universal regulation of PMCs and for regional 
organisations to follow. The General Assembly’s 1989 International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries was ratified 
in 2001, but led to no effective action. Ratification without action is highly 
questionable, and therefore maybe to be more effective jurisdiction and the legality 
of mercenaries fall under regulations made by individual state governments (Blain, 
2005:4). Apart from enforcing the UN convention as soon as possible, countries in 
dire need for effective national regulation can take useful pointers from the Foreign 
Military Assistance Act of the Republic of South Africa of 1998 and the Ottawa 
Treaty that ban the use of anti-personnel landmines (Breytenbach, 2002b:8). 
 
According to Smith (2005:24), for now South Africa’s anti-mercenary laws imply a 
legitimisation of PMCs and PSCs. Smith (2005) believes that such companies are 
obliged to apply to parliament’s arms control committee for permission to work 
overseas in war zones such as Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Iraq. Once such 
companies are legally permitted to operate in war zones – even on the side of 
recognised governments – that gives them ethical legitimacy. Singer (2004b:548) 
proposes that South African legislation that deals with military assistance could be 
amended, by focusing the definition of its scope on the nature of assistance, i.e. 
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 whether the service is military in content or not, rather than the destination of the 
service (the combat zone). In doing this, loopholes will be closed in national 
legislation and therefore national legislation will become more effective. 
 
Irish (1999) proposes five conditions for either prohibiting or regulating PMCs: 
 
• Explore the objectives that drive the legal effort at prohibition or regulation of 
PMCs. For the laws to be adhered to and respected they need to be 
appropriate and clear. The main objective, namely public protection and 
transparency, without being bias to any one state segment of the industry or 
firm must be made clear to add to fairness. 
• Define who and what should fall under the definition, therefore who and what 
must be regulated. Only the combat types, or also those PMCs that provide 
training and advice? This could be done by exploring the type of service offered 
and to see if and how it affects the outcome of the conflict, to let the PMC 
involved fall under the laws of war. 
• Establish specific activities that need to be prohibited or regulated. Human 
rights abuses and other criminal behaviour in the field by the PMCs’ employees 
justify external legal instruction. 
• Determine what body would conduct the actual observation, regulation and 
where necessary enforcement. Some academics plead for the UN or the Red 
Cross to put their hands up in this regard. According to Irish (1999) PMCs 
prefer a self-regulatory model as opposed to outside regulation, believing that 
the market will punish and reward firms based on their performance or 
behaviour. Self-regulation is, however, not a very strong mechanism and could 
be undermined.  
• Look towards a system financed by interested state parties, and obligatory 
tariffs placed on PMCs that receive the sanction provided by the regulatory 
system. 
 
Avant (2000:3) makes the following recommendations to regulate (US) PMCs from 
turning “rogue”. “Policymakers should investigate the cost savings afforded by 
outsourcing, and their evaluation of the overall costs and benefits should consider 
the long-term political and foreign policy implications of privatisation. Stronger US 
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 regulation of military exports is needed, including a more transparent licensing 
process, US government oversight of contracts, and PMC reporting requirements”. 
 
Singer (2004a:17-23) recommends that the governments, NGOs and international 
organisations employing PMCs must decide on the main function that they want to 
fulfil, namely either that of regulator or client. To aid in this decision, regulation 
needs to be drawn up. This could avoid embarrassment due to being both 
regulator and client. Such an example is when the United Nations issued a report 
critical of Executive Outcomes at the same time that it employed Lifeguard 
Security, a company often linked to EO (Electronic Mail & Guardian, 17/07/1998). 
 
Doswald-Beck (1999) believes that multinational or other industries that use such 
companies ought to be accountable in some way for their behaviour; yet these 
clients are neither states nor parties to an internal armed conflict in any traditional 
sense of the word. The security companies concerned are in principle bound by the 
law of the state in which they function; in reality this will not have much effect if they 
actually engage in hostilities. Howe (2000) and Breytenbach (2002b:8) agree with 
Doswald-Beck’s statement that if they (PMCs) are accountable to home state laws 
and regulations, then PMCs are no different from any other company doing 
business in foreign countries. 
 
Regarding regulation of the PMC industry, Singer (2004a:17-21) believes that the 
following areas must be explored: 
 
• Transparency on the accounting-side (open the business to auditing). 
• Standards on outsourcing and privatisation (privatisation can be greatly 
beneficial, up to the point where it begins to move into core functions. Privatise 
something if it will save money or raise quality). 
• Oversight capacity (put tasks up for competition on the open market therefore 
making the clients careful stewards, providing oversight and management, and 
let them guard their own interests. In doing this the firm is motivated through the 
terms of the contract and the fear of losing it, i.e. being fired and losing future 
business). 
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 • Legal accountability (extend legal clarity to the questions of who can work for 
the firms, who the firms can work for, and what bodies and codes will 
investigate, prosecute, and punish any wrongdoing and in which domains. As a 
transnational industry, there is the need for international involvement, with 
proposals ranging from an updating of the international anti-mercenary laws to 
creating a UN body that sanctions and regulates PMCs. This means that each 
state that has any involvement with the industry, either as client or home base, 
has an imperative need to develop and amend its laws that are relevant to 
PMCs. Ideally, states will coordinate their efforts and attempts to involve 
regional bodies to maximise coverage and pave the way to international 
standards). 
 
Moreover, the legal gap extends to the individual conduct level, not just corporate 
behaviour. The best industry of self-regulation lacks any sanction beyond market 
punishment, which is clearly insufficient for actual crimes, including felony offences 
like rape or torture in a prison (Singer, 2004a:22). 
 
Both the US government (also other governments) and PMCs need to work toward 
international regulations that require transparency and accountability and to 
promote the rule of law and respect for human rights (Avant, 2000:3). 
 
Smith (2002:112) also provides some possible solutions: 
 
• The use of the existing provisions of the Geneva Convention that require 
belligerent parties to uphold the provisions of the convention and provide for 
mechanisms such as the International Red Cross to monitor conflicts for 
adherence to international law. 
• The termination of contract(s) or facing prosecution under applicable national or 
international law if the PMC does not abide by international laws regarding the 
treatment of individuals. 
• The day-to-day supervision of PMC activities by an on-site contracting officer 
with powers to withhold payment or terminate the contract if the PMC does not 
act in accordance with government wishes. 
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 • The deployment of an integrated military-diplomatic plans and operations team 
with the PMC and the provision of overall guidance by a government. 
• The invitation of UN observers to monitor the actions of PMCs in order to 
provide better transparency. 
• Stricter enforcement of the US neutrality laws that prohibit an American citizen 
from being hired in the United States to participate in armed conflict with a party 
at peace with America. 
 
Harris & Moller (2004:35) believe that countries should be non-offensive in their 
defence and  rather contribute to a joint task force which would possess the whole 
range of military capacity, with no country that has a complete offensive force of its 
own. Brooks & Solomon (2000:34) echo this sentiment in “the answer to peace in 
Africa would be the creation of a Western Pan-African military force”. This could be 
a possible solution, but regulations and laws need to be drafted with all of the 
contributors pledging their full support.   
 
PMCs and governments need to engage in dialogue to find a workable solution on 
how to incorporate PMCs in official government structures. O’Brien (2000) concurs 
that if governments (such as the South African government) take on the heavy-
handed approach, the doors of “what could be fruitful” dialogue will close and 
PMCs will put up shop elsewhere and therefore operate much more covertly. 
 
Although all these recommendations mentioned above are credible and a move in 
the right direction to find workable solutions, they also contain some loopholes. Not 
all governments in countries where PMCs are involved are completely legitimate or 
democratic. Some countries have and are renowned for human rights abuses. One 
such an example for the purpose of this study is Equatorial Guinea, where MPRI is 
involved. The Obiang government has vast oil resources and the dependence of 
the US on the commodity could put the government in an excellent bargaining 
position. In fact, the government could be the puppet masters and the PMC the 
puppet. 
 
According to a UN Press Release on 16 November 1999, the PMCs who are 
involved in the specific country continues to exploit the concessions it has received 
 75
 once a greater degree of security is attained. They therefore obtained a foothold to 
set up a number of affiliates and associates to engage in activities ranging from 
mining, building, transport, importing and export. By doing this they (the PMCs and 
their associates) are making themselves a dominating or large player in the 
economic structure of the country and also an important dependant. A number of 
commentators (Francis, 1999, and Musah & Fayemi, 2000) argue that it is wrong 
for governments to pay for security by mortgaging future returns from mineral 
exploitation. Nevertheless, if a government is faced with the choice of mortgaging 
some of its mineral resources or leaving them entirely in the hands of rebels, it 
might be legitimate for such a government to take the former course. 
 
Other commentators (Zarate, 1998) have argued that the association of PMCs with 
mineral extraction has a positive side. Firstly, from the PMC's point of view, it might 
be one of the few ways the PMC can be sure of being paid. Secondly, an interest 
in mineral extraction will give a PMC a vested interest in peace and stability 
(Zarate, 1998). One could also argue that it gives the PMC a vested interest in 
conflict. Since PMCs are paid to deal with conflict situations, some feel that they 
have no interest in ending conflict (unlike national armies who are paid in 
peacetime). 
 
The United Nations' official condemnation of mercenary activities prevents the 
establishment of a UN regulatory mechanism. Creehan (2002) mentions that 
without proper regulation by an organisation such as the United Nations, 
mercenaries (or PMCs) cannot be relied on to adhere to the same ethical 
standards as national military forces party to international agreements such as the 
Geneva Convention.  
 
Adams (2002:62) feels that the UN is not very concerned about mercenary activity 
and brands the Rapporteur report as a mere academic exercise, backing this 
statement with the information of the lacklustre support of the commission and 
certain valuable role players and UN member states to the mandate against 
recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries. Adams (2002:62) also 
mentions that the only two significant signatories to the Convention are Germany 
and Italy and that they are not significant suppliers of mercenaries or home to large 
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 security firms, and that Angola (mercenaries in Angola in the 1970’s and employing 
EO), Zaire and the Congo are signatories in spite of the fact that they make use of 
mercenaries in their internal struggles despite of their own laws forbidding the 
mercenary activity. The obligations on states to be accountable and responsible for 
their citizens in a globalised world are increasing and the International Criminal 
Court could provide a solution if the US provides the necessary support. Their non-
participatory attitude could cause enforcement problems on PMCs activities. 
 
To conclude, regulation and not prohibition is needed. According to Isenberg 
(2000), at a minimum such regulation must be based on greater transparency. 
“Some transparency is already provided by media scrutiny of PMCs, especially 
larger PMCs, in the countries in which they are headquartered and in which they 
operate. But even better would be some sort of regular declaration of their 
activities” (Isenberg, 2000). “We have laws to govern for the worst of human 
behaviour; in no other domains than this (PMC industry) do we simply hope for the 
best in their absence” (Singer, 2004a:22). 
 
5.3  The future of PMCs in Africa (what must PMCs do to be regarded as 
“peacemakers”?) 
 
O’Brien (2000) states that PMCs (and some PSCs) currently undertake missions 
which are the traditional domain of peacekeeping operations; these include 
protection of humanitarian assistance, demining, child-soldier repatriation, 
paramedical clinics, and other factors. Although PMCs are fundamentally about 
combat, applying certain skills to the abovementioned areas might just help them to 
shed their sometimes tarnished “mercenary” image. PMCs can continue to provide 
military assistance, for example Defence Systems Limited’s military assistance in a 
peacekeeping environment where international peacekeeping forces are not 
present. These companies could also provide rapid-reaction forces to intervene on 
behalf of the UN, OAU, OAS or ASEAN, to halt aggression or to stop genocide 
when Western governments are unable or unwilling to act. The question is however 
if they will halt aggression and stop genocide if they are not paid in oil, diamonds or 
hard currency? Highly likely, the current situation in Sudan – Darfur is just one 
example of non involvement for no pay. 
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McIntyre (2004:101) mentions that DynCorp Corporation and Pacific Architects and 
Engineers provided housing, office equipment, transport and communications 
equipment in support of African Union troops. Although the nature of the support 
was logistical and may therefore seem innocuous, it nonetheless enabled scarce 
military resources to be concentrated where they were most needed. O’Brien 
(2000) concurs that PMCs are also capable of supporting the execution of 
international arrest warrants, conducting hostage-rescue operations, or serving as 
counter-narcotics/-terrorism forces. 
 
O’Brien (1998) believes that PMCs are not trained in the culture of peacekeeping 
and concurs that PMCs are fundamentally about combat, not peacekeeping but 
with conflict continuing and states being unwilling to participate in humanitarian 
interventions, PMCs might find themselves becoming very “popular” to fill the void. 
It is therefore important to go about regulating them in a responsible way, because 
they might have an important function to fulfil in the not so distant future. ”For 
generations we have seen the private sector make money off war, the time has 
come to let it make a profit out of peace” (Isenberg, 2000). 
 
Although we do not focus on The Prohibition of Mercenary Activities and 
Prohibition and Regulation of certain Activities in Areas of Armed Conflict Bill of 
2006 for the purpose of this study, it is relevant in mentioning that Brooks (2006:5) 
concurs that such legislation would undermine peacekeeping operations, from 
Darfur in Sudan to Haiti and Iraq, because the “costs of peace” would soar. PMCs 
are still a more cost effective option than the employment of the UN peacekeeping 
forces. Brooks (2006:5) mentions that the UN itself (see below) made use of the 
private sector to provide security for UN operations. The above-mentioned bill 
invites criticism for “hindering South Africans doing legitimate humanitarian and 
private security work abroad” (Le Roux, 2006:5). 
 
Straw (2002) pointed out in the foreword of the UK Green Paper on PMCs that “A 
strong and reputable private military sector might have a role in enabling the UN to 
respond more rapidly and more effectively in crises. The cost of employing private 
military companies for certain functions in UN operations could be much lower than 
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 that of national armed forces.” Even Kofi Annan (1998), former secretary-general of 
the United Nations, said that “When we had need of skilled soldiers to separate 
fighters from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps in Goma, I even considered 
the possibility of engaging a private firm.”  
 
In short, legislators must define these categories (PMC and PSC) and the 
companies under the microscope must “get off the fence” and decide where they 
want to be, if they want to be considered by the UN or the AU as “new 
peacemakers”, become “legit or go bust”! De Coning (2006:11) adds that “the legal 
basis for the use of force by international peacekeepers is intrinsically linked to the 
legitimacy and credibility they derive from their UN Security Council mandates 
based on Chapter 7 (and 8 in the case of the AU) of the UN Charter. The status of 
peacekeepers as serving soldiers in the national defence forces of member states 
of the UN or AU, temporarily deployed as part of a multinational UN or AU 
peacekeeping force, provide an additional national legal framework (and recourse) 
within which such operations are undertaken and regulated” (De Coning, 2006:11). 
 
For PMCs therefore to be considered as “new peacemakers” a clearer definition of 
what they do and what they are is not debatable, the definitions of mercenaries are 
archaic and cannot be used to define PMCs. According to De Coning (2006:11) the 
current legal framework “Geneva Conventions, International and National legal 
frameworks taken together provides an internationally acceptable legal context 
within which lethal force may be used, under certain specific circumstances, on 
behalf of the international community to maintain international peace and security.” 
 
After researching the legal framework that deals with PMCs it is clear that quite a 
few companies are borderline cases and even more are currently operating outside 
the current legal framework. Companies that are engaging in combat, the combat 
type PMC or, as De Coning (2006:11) calls them, the PMC that provides offensive 
security services, will currently exclude themselves from getting a nod to be 
contracted by international organisations (UN an AU) to aid in peacekeeping 
processes. 
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 Borderline companies or those who provide logistical and “defensive security 
services” provide for interesting thoughts since they are regarded as “sitting on the 
fence”. De Coning (2006:11) believes that although they are in the middle, many 
UN agencies already outsource static “guard type security services to local private 
security companies, but in most cases these people would be unarmed”. PMFs 
Pacific Architects and Engineers and ICI Oregon supported ECOMOG forces in 
West Africa and are currently supporting both UNMIL (Liberia) and UNAMSIL 
(Sierra Leone) (McIntyre, 2004:101). “The idea that private military and security 
companies can fill this security gap still has to be tested” (De Coning, 2006:11). 
 
A positive note is the willingness shown by quite a few PMCs to co-operate and to 
become legitimate. This will help them to secure more contracts and to aid with 
much needed transparency and regulation of the PMC industry. Healthy debates 
between all the parties are continuing and are welcomed. The powers to govern 
and legitimise these PMCs and keep them from turning rogue are vested with the 
states (countries) of origin or the regional entities, and international bodies or 
countries that contract them. All these actors in the equation together with human 
rights issues that need to be addressed contribute to a very complex situation. 
Before PMCs can be considered as the “new peacemakers”, therefore aiding or 
taking over the peacekeeping duties from the UN, quite a few changes need to be 
made to the current regulatory framework. It is up to the above-mentioned parties 
to keep the dog at bay or on a very tight leash, so that it does not bite the hand that 
feeds it, or go underground, and turn rogue. 
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